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THE ART OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
IDENTIFYING THE INTERPRETIVE THEORY OF THE
JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR VETERANS' CLAIMS AND THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT
Linda D. Jellum*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the art of statutory interpretation, a topic of
interest to scholars, academics, and practitioners. Whether you are a judge
interpreting statutes, an academic teaching soon-to-be new lawyers how to
interpret statutes, or a practitioner arguing the meaning of a statute to a
judge, statutory interpretation matters. "The proper method of interpreting
statutes is an enormously important legal issue that has seen enormous
theoretical discussion, including some by Supreme Court Justices
themselves."' Yet, despite its importance, there is no universally agreed
upon method for interpreting statutes.
Why must lawyers interpret statutes? Simply put, "legislation is an act
of communication to be understood on the simple model of speaker and
audience, so that the commanding question in legislative interpretation is
what a particular speaker or group 'meant' in some canonical act of
utterance." 2 This particular "speaker or group" is the enacting legislature.
Hence, statutory interpretation is the art of discerning the intent of the
enacting legislature, "for it is the enacting legislature that has the
constitutional authority to make law." 3 For this reason, judges attempt to

* Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law, BA, Cornell University; J.D. 1989,
Cornell Law School. The article was prepared for and presented at the Twelfth Judicial Conference of the
United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims held in May 2010 in Washington, D.C. I would like to
thank the organizers of the conferenceJudge Davis andJudge Hagel, and especially, Professor Michael Allen, for
inviting me to speak. I also thank Mercer University School of Law for research and technological assistance.
Finally, I would like to thank Chris Featherstun,J.D., for his outstanding research assistance. Comments and
questions can be sent toJellumjl@law.mercer.edu.
I Frank B. Cross, The &gmnfice ofStanoy Interpretav Medddnlolger, 82 NOTRE DAME L REV. 1971, 1971
(2007).
2RONALD DWORKIN, IAw's EMPIRE 348 (1986).
'Linda D.Jellum, MASTERING STATUrORY INTERPRETATION 12 (2008).
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interpret statutes as the enacting legislature would have wanted, or
intended.4
Interpreting statutes as originally intended sounds easy. It is not; for
many reasons, discerning the enacting legislature's intent is extremely
difficult. One difficulty arises from discerning the intent of a group of
individuals all having potentially different intents.5 How do judges discern
each and every legislator's intent? Judges cannot simply contact the
legislators after the fact and ask them what they intended to accomplish.
Even if the legislators were still alive, even if they remembered having an
intent regarding the specific issue before the court, and even if they
remembered accurately what that intent was, such after-the-fact
rationalizations are not considered valid evidence of the intent of an entire
legislature. 6 Another difficulty lies with the idea that there is one, unified
"meeting of the minds."7 While legislators may share the goal of passing a
bill to address a particular problem, rarely will all legislators have the
identical reason for passage or even the same expectations regarding the
bill's impact. Rather, bills are the result of political compromise. A bill
"emerges from the hubbub of legislative struggle, from the drafts of
beginning lawyers, from the work of lobbyists who are casual about clarity
but forcefil about policy, from the chaos of adjournment deadlines." 8
Because of the chaotic enactment process, bills are filled with ambiguity,
absurdity, lack of clarity, mistakes, and omissions.9 Legislators rarely intend
to be ambiguous, absurd, unclear, mistaken, or incomplete, but they
regularly are.10

4

1Id

5See discussion infa Part 1B.1.

6 S* eg., McDonald v. Comm'r, 764 F.2d 322, 336 n.25 (5th Cir. 1985) ('TheJoint Committee['s] ...
'Explanation' was issued after the fact. Hence it does not directly represent the views of the legislators or an
explanation available to them when acting on the bill.").
7 SM Max Radin, Statuoy Intapretaion,43 HARV. L REV. 863, 870 (1930) ('The chances that. . . several
hundred [individuals] each will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind as possible reductions of a
given [statutory issue], are infinitesimally small.").

8JACK DAvIEs, LEGISIATIVE LAW AND PROCESS INA NUSELL 304 (2nd ed. 1986).
9S eg., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 91-95 (1985) (finding that a federal statute that required land
owners to file a record of ownership with the Bureau of Land Management "prior to December 31 of each year,"
meant "on or before December 31," and holding that it was the legislature's responsibility to be more careful, not
the court's job to rescue Congress from its drafting error); see aLo Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v.
Laidlaw Transit Seivs., Inc., 435 F.3d 1140, 1142-46 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the word "less" in the Class
Action Faimess Act actually meant "more" when the statute provided, "a court of appeals may accept an
appeal ... if application is made to the court of appeals not less than 7 days after entry of the order' (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2006))). Se gmeray Recent Case, Satutory Consruct-DrajlWgFrvs-D.C Caat Delaes
Section 92 of&eNaionalBankActInzsd-Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. v. Clarke, 105 HARV. L
REV. 2116 (1992).
1o For a sample listing of absurd state laws, see Dunb amd Cray Imas, BORED.COM,
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Because of the difficulty of discerning legislative intent, judges have
adopted a number of ways to interpret statutes. Some judges focus on the
words of the text, believing that by giving words their ordinary meaning,
judges will best discern legislative intent." Other judges focus on the
purpose of the bill, believing that furthering that purpose is the best way to
discern legislative intent.12 And other judges focus on the piecemeal nature
of the legislative process, believing that by comparing various versions of the
bill and any legislators' statements accompanying those versions, they will
best discern legislative intent.' 3 Legal scholars have named these ways of
interpreting statutes the "theories of interpretation" and have exhaustively
argued about which theory best accomplishes the goal of statutory
interpretation. While lawyers are less aware of the differences, lawyers must
master this topic to be effective advocates.
Perhaps more than for any other subject, understanding theory is
critical to understanding statutory interpretation because theory drives
every aspect of statutory interpretation. A judge's theory of interpretation
determines what information a judge will consider when searching for
meaning. 14 For example, some judges will not look at legislative history or
social context for meaning unless the text of the statute is ambiguous or
absurd.'5 Assuming that the legislative history is helpful to a case, lawyers
must learn to "talk the talk" to persuade these judges to move beyond the
text.
This Article will help you learn to talk the talk, to understand why
theory matters, and to identify the theory of your decision maker. Knowing
ajudge's theory may not help you win your case, for judges are rightly more
concerned with underlying equities than with dogmatically following a
theory of interpretation; but knowing a judge's theory will help you
communicate your case more effectively. In short, knowing theory will
make you a better advocate, a better judge, and a better scholar, whether
you are trying to convince your judge, your colleagues, or your readers.
This Article proceeds as follows: In Part II, I identify the three sources
of meaning that judges use when interpreting statutes: intrinsic sources,
extrinsic sources, and policy-based sources. I also provide examples of each
source. In Part III, I explore the three most prevalent theories of
interpretation: textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism. Additionally, I
http://www.boredcom/crazyiaws/ (last visitedJuly 24, 2010).
" Se infa PartLilA. 1.
2 Se infa Part lI.B.2.
"Si-yaPartfl.B.1.
4 S! infra Part E2.
15Sm inf a Part 11.A.2.
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identify a few less prevalent theories. In doing so, I explain the goals and
sources common to each of these theories. After explaining each theory, I
then explore opinions from both the Veterans Court and the Federal
Circuit to demonstrate how judges actually use these theories to resolve
statutory-interpretation cases. Seeing how specific judges approach these
issues will help you determine how your decision maker might approach
these issues. Finally, in Part IV, I explain why theory matters: Simply put,
knowing how judges use statutory-interpretation theories will help you
become a better advocate, judge, or scholar.
II. THE EVIDENTIARY SOURCES OF MEANING
To understand theory, you must first understand the three sources of
information, or evidence, judges will consider when interpreting statutory
language: (1) intrinsic sources of evidence, (2) extrinsic sources of evidence,
and (3) policy-based sources of evidence.' 6 The sources of statutory
interpretation and the theories of statutory interpretation are related, but
different. The sources underlie the theories. Let us start with the most basic
sources-intrinsic sources.
A. Intrinsic Sources
Intrinsic sources are those sources that are part of the official act being
interpreted, including the language of the statute itself. 7 The first step in
the interpretation process is always "(1) read the statute, (2) Read the
Statute, (3) READ THE STATUTE!"18 While text is the most important
intrinsic source, words alone are not the only intrinsic source of meaning.
Other intrinsic sources include: grammar and punctuation; the components
of the act, including purpose and findings clauses, titles, and definition
sections; and the linguistic canons of statutory interpretation. 9 The
linguistic canons are rules we intuitively apply to language to help us
understand a speaker or writer's meaning. Hence, these canons can help us
understand statutory language. For example, the linguistic canon noscitur a
sociis suggests that words in a statute should not be read in isolation because

16See gzeray William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The &prwne Cout 1993 Tee-Forawrd Lay as
F4uibmon, 108 HARV. L REV. 26, 97 (1994) (categorizing sources of statutory interpretation).
"7SwJELLUM, .supra note 3, at 13; Eskridge & Frickey, .upra note 16, at 97-9.
'6 John M. Kemochan, Stattoy Intopretatran An Outhne ofMthod, 3 DALHousIE LJ. 333, 338 (1976) (citing
HENRYJ. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 202 (1967)).
1 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 97-99.
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words are best understood in textual context.20 Hence, Justice Scalia
famously said, "If you tell me, 'I took the boat out on the bay,' I understand
'bay' to mean one thing; if you tell me, 'I put the saddle on the bay,' I
understand it to mean something else." 2 ' All of these sources are intrinsic
because they are part of the text enacted into law (or, in the case of the
linguistic canons, applied to the text enacted into law). And all of these
sources play an important role in interpretation.
B. Extrinsic Sources
Extrinsic sources, a second source of meaning, are materials outside of
the official act but within the legislative process that created that act. 22
Extrinsic sources relate not to the text itself; rather, they relate to the
enactment process. An example of an extrinsic source is legislative
history-statements made during the enactment process. Another example
is the canon that legislative silence in response to a judicial interpretation of
a statute means agreement with the interpretation; this canon is known as
legislative acquiescence. There are other extrinsic sources. For example,
there is a presumption that by borrowing another state's statute the
legislature intended to adopt that state's judicial opinions as well. Finally,
the Chevron doctrine, by which courts defer to reasonable agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes,2 3 is an extrinsic source. All of these
examples are extrinsic because they relate to the legislative enactment
process; they help show the enacting legislature's intent.
The use of some of these extrinsic sources is relatively
noncontroversial-such as deference to agency interpretations. The use of
others is more controversial-such as legislative history. 24 Not so long ago,
judges turned to extrinsic sources, especially legislative history, rather
readily.25 Today, as a result of the focus on text, extrinsic sources play a
supporting, rather than the starring, role in interpretation. 26

20

S id at 97.

SCALIA, AMYATEROFINTERPRErATON: FEDERAL COUIS ANDTHE LAW26 (1997).
2ANroNIN
2

SJELLUM, .pra note 3, at 14; Eskridge & Frickey, wpra note 16, at 100-01.
Chevron U.SA, Inc. v. Nat'1 Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
2 JELLUMwpra note 3, at 14.
" SJohn F. Manning, IWalRmhsm & the Ganms'Rn4 5 GREEN BAG 283, 287-88 (2002).
-S infrm Part ll.B. 1.
2
4
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C. Policy-BasedSources
The third category of sources judges turn to for interpretive meaning is
policy based. Policy-based sources are extrinsic to both the statutory text
and the legislative process. 27 They reflect important social and legal choices
derived from the Constitution or existing common-law ideals.2 8 One
example of a policy-based source is the constitutional-avoidance doctrine,
which is a canon directing that if two fair interpretations of a statute exist
and only one raises constitutional questions, then the other interpretation
should prevail. 29 Another policy-based source is the rule of lenity. This rule
directs that where two reasonable interpretations of a criminal statute exist,
a court should adopt the less penal interpretation.30 Also policy-based are
two corollary rules: (1) statutes in derogation of the common law should be
strictly construed, and (2) remedial statutes should be broadly construed. 3'
Last, the clear-statement canon is policy based; this canon directs judges to
presume that in some important situations Congress would not have meant
to alter the status quo absent a clear statement to that effect. 32
Reliance on policy-based sources has come in and out of vogue.33 For
example, the rule of lenity, which arises from constitutional due-process
concerns about providing adequate notice of penal conduct, has been
relegated to a rule of last resort, given society's current focus on penalizing
criminals.34 Indeed, some state legislatures, such as California, have
attempted to abolish the rule of lenity by statute;35 however, because the
rule of lenity is derived from constitutional procedural due-process
concerns, state legislatures have had limited success legislatively abolishing
it.36 Currently, with the exception of the clear-statement rule, these policybased sources play, at best, a minor role in interpretation.

27

2

JELLUM,.spra note 3, at 14-15; se Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 101-08.
JEILUM, supra note 3, at 14.

'*

Id

31

Id

8

2Id at 15.
3 Id
34 Md
3 Se CAL. PENAL CODE §4 (West 1999) ("The rule of the common law, that penal statutes are to be
strictly construed, has no application to this Code. All its pnvisions are to be construed according to the fair
import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice."); accordN.Y. PENAL LAW §5.00
(McKinney 2009).
3 Eg., People er reL Lungren v. Superior Court, 926 P.2d 1042, 1053-54 (Cal. 1996) ("[Whle ... the rule
of the common law ... has been abrogated ... it is also true that the defendant is entitled to the benefit of every
reasonable doubt, whether it arise out of a question of fict, or as to the true interpretation of woris or the
construction of language used in a statute.. . ." (quoting Exparte Roseheim, 83 Cal. 388,391 (Cal. 1890)) (intemal
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While it would be helpful if the above categories were consistently
identified in judicial opinions, they are not. What one judge calls a policybased source, another might identify as an extrinsic source. Understanding
exactly which category a source falls within is less important than
understanding that: (1) a breadth of informational sources are available to
judges to help them discern a statute's meaning and (2) some judges are
more willing than others to look at these various sources for meaning. What
sources a judge will consider depends on that judge's theory of statutory
interpretation.
III. THE THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION

Statutory interpretation is a "quest by judges to use the best available
theory and [sources] to determine 'what statutes mean."' 37 Unfortunately,
there is no uniform method of statutory interpretation used by all judges.38
Rather, judges interpret statutes in a variety of ways that consider and
emphasize the three sources identified above differently.39 These ways,
approaches really, are known as the theories of statutory interpretation.40
Adherents of the different theories disagree about which sources show the
intent of the enacting legislature and, thus, provide the best evidence of
meaning.
The three most well-known theories, which are described in more detail
below, are textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism. Not surprisingly,
their adherents are known as textualists, intentionalists, and purposivists.
Textualist judges believe that enacted text is the most important source;
thus, textualists look primarily, but not exclusively, to intrinsic sources. 4'
Intentionalist judges look for the specific intent of the enacting legislature;
thus, intentionalists find extrinsic sources particularly illuminating.42
quotation marks omitted)); People v. Ditta, 422 N.E.2d 515, 517 (N.Y. 1981) ("Although [Penal Law § 5.00]
obviously does not justify the imposition of criminal sanctions for conduct that falls beyond the scope ofthe Penal
(citations
Law, it does authorize a court to dispense with hypertechnical or strained interpretations .
omitted)).
" Cheryl Boudreau et al., Wiat Stadt Marm Interprtive Lesamfran Psinie 77mmier of Commwicaim and
Legislatim, 44 SAN DIEGO L REV. 957,958 (2007).
3 Se Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I thought we had adopted a
regular method for interpreting the meaning ofa... statute: first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its
textual context; and second, using established canons of construction, ask whether there is any dear indication
that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies.").
oAJ
nJudging The Rok ofa Suprne Corwt in a
39 Sm Aharon Barak, The Sorne Cow4 2001 Tm-Fraw
Ikmocrac, 116 HARV. L REV. 16,65--6 (2002) (stating the author's view that purposivism isbest).
4oIn addition to the statutory interpretation theories, there are a number ofacademic theories that relate to
the legislative pmocess. These theories are less often visible in judicial opinions. For more information, see
JELUM,. szm note 3, at 33-36.
41 For a detailed description of this theory, see generally SCALA,.spra note 21.
4S inyra Part L.B.
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Purposivist judges search for the purpose of the statute's enactment, which
may be revealed by any of the three sources.43
Importantly, judges can and do blend these theories for a variety of
reasons. A judge may generally prefer one theory, but find that for a
specific case, or even a specific issue, the preferred theory does not work.
Hence, that judge may adopt a different theory or meld a variety of
theories. Additionally, appellate opinions are written by one judge, who
may use one theory. But he or she is joined by other judges who may use a
different theory. Also, theories change over time as a judge decides that a
particular source (text or legislative history, for example) should have a
greater or lesser role in the interpretive process. For all these reasons,
judicial opinions rarely exemplify consistency.
Keep in mind that none of the theories is perfect: each has its strengths
and its weaknesses, its proponents and its critics. Perhaps because of the
imperfections, the preferred theory has changed over time.44 A theory that
dominated during one era often falls out of favor in the next. For example,
early in American jurisprudence, judges preferred purposivism; today,
textualism has gained currency.4 5 Debate over the appropriate theory has
raged; indeed, the battle over this choice has left the pages of academic law
journals and has taken center stage in judicial opinions and legislative
debates.4 6 For example, in State v. Courchesne, the Connecticut Supreme
Court evaluated the various theories and selected purposivism. 47 Ironically,
the state legislature later overturned the court's choice, opting for textualism
instead.48

4 The point of this Article is not to argue that a particular theory best determines meaning, those
arguments have already been made. S* eg., Carlos E Gonzalez, Satutoy Intprtadm. Laing Back Laing
Fnward, 58 RUTGERS L REV. 703 (2006) (exploring some ofthe arguments surrounding statutory interpretation);
see alo Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, IntprdamandInsdutums, 101 MICH. L REV. 885, 890-913 (2003)
(cataloging the influential work on interpretation).
"JEILUM, supra note 3, at 16.
45I
4

6 S id
47Se State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562,587 (Conn. 2003).
4 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-2z (2005). AsJudge Borden, the author ofthe majority opinion in Coorkem
noted.
It is ironic that the legislative debate surmunding [this statute] specifically indicated that its purpose
was to overnmle that part of GCheme. If we were to read [this statute] literally, and assume that it is
not ambiguous in any way, we would be baned by it from consulting that very legislative history in
order to determine that its purpose was to ovemle
Carmel Hollow Assocs. Ild. 'ship v. Town of Bethlehem, 848 A.2d 451, 470 n.1 (Conn. 2004) (Borden, J.,
concurring) (intemal citations omitted).

nacheme.
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Below, I explore in some detail these theories, beginning with
textualism. Keep in mind, however, that the theories I describe below are
neither exhaustive nor exclusive.
A. Textualism
Textualism is a theory that places enacted text at the forefront of
interpretation. 49 Textualists focus on enacted text because they believe that
judges should faithfully protect the power distribution identified within the
vesting clauses of the Constitution.5 0 According to the Constitution, the
legislature enacts laws,5 ' while the judiciary interprets laws.52 Moreover, for
legislation to be enacted, the Constitution requires bicameral passage and
either executive approval or a legislative override of an executive veto. 3
Hence, "[t] extualists argue that looking beyond the text raises constitutional
concerns. Textualists 'would hold Congress to the words it used.... [TJo
do otherwise would permit Congress to legislate without completing the
required process for enactment of legislation."' 5 4
Textualism, often called the plain-meaning theory of interpretation,
relies on the plain-meaning canon of interpretation. 55 The plain-meaning
canon of interpretation directs judges to look for the plain, or ordinary,
meaning of the words in the statute. By discerning the "plain meaning" of
the words, textualists believe that they most effectively carry out the
legislature's agenda. This canon nicely matches textualists' interpretative
goal because textualists presume that the legislature used words, grammar,
and punctuation to communicate this agenda. Textualists looks for "a sort
of 'objectified' intent-the intent that a reasonable person would gather
from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpusjuris."5 6
In other words, textualists look for the "ring the words [of the statute] would
have had to a skilled user of words at the time, thinking about the same

"JELLUM,

supra note 3, at 16.

50Id
5U.S. CONsr. ar. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House ofRepresentatives").
5Id art. M, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may fnm time to time ordain and establish.").
5Id at I, § 7.
5u UNDA D. JELLuM & DAVID C. HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: PROBLEMS,
THEORIES, AND LAWYERING STRATIEGIES 45 (2d ed. 2009) (quoting Carl Chomsky, Unldding de Myefes of
IIo Tmi Sp Let, andlKy inStauy Interpnraamo, 100 COLUM. L REV. 901, 951 (2000)).
-Id at 44 n.*. The plain-meaning canon instmucts that the plain meaning of the words of the statute
should control interpretation.
6 SCAuA, szr note 21, at 17.
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58
problem."57 Textualism, particularly in its modem form, is appealing, in
part because of its inherent simplicity: examine the text with a dictionary in
hand and then be done interpreting.

But, one might ask, does textualism favor simplicity over accuracy?
Perhaps. All forms of textualism rely heavily on the plain-meaning canon.
Yet, one problem with the plain-meaning canon is that language that seems
clear to one person can be ambiguous or even mean something completely
different to another person.5 9 The cases identified so far should show that
judges often disagree about what statutory language means. Consider the
following examples as well: Is a "buck" a deer or a dollar? Is "dust" a verb
or a noun? Is "bay" a body of water or a horse? Words mean more than
one thing. While textual context, specifically the immediately surrounding
words, will often help resolve meaning, equally often it will not. Litigation
arises precisely because litigants and their lawyers disagree about a statute's
meaning. Theoretically, the plain-meaning canon should never resolve the
issue in any litigated case involving statutes unless one party is simply being
unreasonable. If the meaning were so plain, the litigants would not be in
court paying huge sums of money to their attorneys to litigate the meaning
of clear words.
There are other drawbacks with the plain-meaning canon. The
meaning of words can vary with textual context. Illustratively, the word
"assault" might mean one thing in a criminal statute and something
completely different in a tort statute. Further, the linguistic capability of
readers (including judges) can affect meaning; thus, other nontextual sources
of meaning are often essential to interpretation. The New Mexico Supreme
Court explained why:
[Textualism's] beguiling simplicity may mask a host of reasons why a
statute, apparently clear and unambiguous on its face, may for one reason
or another give rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences of opinion
concerning the statute's meaning....

57

Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of UjmIntmt m &alutoiyGCsbuctim, 11 HARv.J.L & PUB. POL'Y 59,61
(1988).
(s See ifa Part f.A2.
59For example, in Meeks v. West, 13 Vet. App. 40 (1999), the dissent strongly disagreed with the
majority that the text of the statute at issue in that case was clear and unambiguous. Id at 44-45
(Steinberg & Kramer, JJ., dissenting). Criticizing the majority for "blithely" asserting that the text of
statute had a plain meaning, the dissent said, "Ihis conclusion seems fanciful. At the very least, [the
statute] is an ambiguous statute that requires much interpretation .... ". Id at 44.
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. . . "[T]his rule is deceptive in that it implies that words have intrinsic
meanings. A word is merely a symbol which can be used to refer to
different things. Difficult questions of statutory interpretation ought not to
be decided by the bland invocation of abstract jurisprudential maxims. ...

The assertion in a judicial opinion that a statute needs no
interpretation because it is 'clear and unambiguous' is in reality evidence
that the court has already considered and construed the act."60
Thus, despite its intuitive appeal, the plain-meaning canon, which is the
very essence of moderate textualism, is imperfect.
Of all the theorists, textualists use the fewest sources, examining
primarily the intrinsic sources. Thus, textualists will look at the text of the
statute, including grammar and punctuation. Indeed, textualists are so text
focused that they revere dictionaries, which allegedly provide the ordinary
meaning of these words.6 ' Additionally, they will look to the act as a whole,
62
both alone and within its statutory context, and to the linguistic canons.
Generally, only when these intrinsic sources fail to identify the meaning of
63
the statute will textualists look to other sources for meaning.
Even when the intrinsic sources fail, textualists are reluctant to consider
legislative history.64 Textualists believe that a text-centered approach
"accompanied by a reduced reliance on legislative history... tend[s] to
shift the spotlight away from the judge and back. to the legislature." 6 5

6oState a rel Helman v. Gallegos, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (N.M. 1994) (quoting 2A NORMANJ. SINGER,
STATUrES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §45.02, at 5 (5th ed. 1992)); saeeg,Maks, 13 Vet. App. at 44-45

(1999) (Steinberg & Kramer, J., dissenting) (calling the majority's assertion that the text was dear "especially
problematic," "blithely assert[ed]," and "[w]ithout explanation"); see also Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810
(2d Cir. 1934) ("[A]s the articulation of a statute increases, the mom for interpretation must contract .... ), affd,
293 U.S. 465 (1935).
61S eg., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 225-28 (1994) (usingRandmn House Dicicnay of
de E'rgish Lpaguag, Webster's hinwNav hnteasnatoal Thedonrmy, Ord FEAdi Diconamy, and Black's Law Dictonay to
interpret the word "modify" and rjecting petitioner's reliance on Webstr's 77iNa.v IntenaonalDichammy);Patie
v. Area Coop. Educ. Servs., No. CV000440418S, 2004 WL 1489555, *4-5 (Conn. Super. Ct.June 16, 2004)
(citing Random House Diciona-yof tie BrgMde LangW~, Ame-an Haitag Dictatary of the Lagbsh Lmgutp, and Webste's
7ird.Ma IntomalinualDictonayto interpret the word "assault").
62JELLUM, spra note 3, at 21.
63 S*e g., Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 67 (2004) (Ihomas, J., concurring) ('If
the text ... [is] dear, resort to anything else [is) unwananted."); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 163 (1991)
(ScaliaJ., concuning) ("Since there was here no contention of a 'scrivener's eror' prmducing an absurd result, the
plain text of the statute should have made this litigation unnecessary and unmaintainable.").
64 Kons Buick Pridac GMC Inc., 543 U.S. at 73 (2004) (Scalia,J., dissenting) ("I have often criticized the
Court's use of legislative history because it lends itself to a king of ventriloquism. The Congressional record or
committee reports are used to make words appear to come from Congress's mouth which were spoken or written
byothers....").
65John M. Walker, Jr., Jrrcia Tadocier in Stassary Grtatiorr ffiri Vntg 0w de Rde of ie Jue, 58
N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L 203,238 (2001).
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Limiting the use of legislative history lessens the controversy surrounding
interpretation by placing "political heat" back on the legislative branch,
which is accountable to the electorate.6 6
1. Soft Plain-Meaning Textualists
There is more than one type of textualist. While all textualists rely
foremost on the text of the statute for meaning, adherents of the different
forms of textualism differ.in their willingness to consider sources in addition
to the text. "Soft plain meaning" is the oldest form of textualism; these
theorists view the text as the primary, but not as the exclusive, source of
meaning. For this reason, soft plain-meaning textualists are willing to
consider legislative history and context. These theorists do not need to find
a reason, such as ambiguity, absurdity, or scrivener's error, to consider these
extratextual sources.67
Soft plain-meaning textualists are less prevalent today than in the past,
but they do exist. For example,Judge Hagel used soft plain-meaning theory
in Osman v. Peake.68 The issue in that case was whether the son of two
permanently disabled veterans was entitled to one dependent-educationalassistance benefit or whether he was entitled to two separate awards, one
based on each parent's disability.69 The Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board)
had denied the son's second request for benefits, which was based on his
mother's disability, because the son had already received benefits based on
his father's disability.70
The Veterans Court reversed the Board's denial.7' In doing so, Judge
Hagel first identified the purpose of the statute.72 The codified purpose was
to
provid[e] opportunities for education to children whose education would
otherwise be impeded or interrupted by reason of the disability or death of
a parent. . . incurred or aggravated in the Armed Forces ... and ... [to]
6

Suid

Sa eg., Tello v. McMahon, 677 F. Supp. 1436, 1441 (E.D. Cal. 1988) ("[A]nalysis begins with
application of the plain meaning rule and is followed by examination of the legislative history. If any ambiguity
remains after application of these two primary means of statutory construction, the court may apply other textual
means of construction .... ); Cohen v. Comm'r of the Div. of Med. Assistance, 668 N.E.2d 769, 774 (Mass.
1996) ("Only if the legislative history compelled a different cnclusion might we depart from the plain meaning of
the statute.").
so Osman v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 252 (2008).
69Id at 253.
67

'o1d
71 Id

72Id

at 255.
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aido such children in attaining the educational status which they might
normally have aspired to and obtained but for the disability or death of
such parent.73
Note that purpose, in this case, had been codified.74 Some textualist judges
are more comfortable relying on codified purpose rather than implied
purpose.75
Only after noting the purpose of the statute did judge Hagel identify the
text of the relevant statute: "Each eligible person shall . . . be entitled to
receive educational assistance." 76 "Person" in the statute had been defined
as a "child of a person who, as a result of qualifying service ... has a
disability permanent in nature resulting from a service-connected
disability."77 Judge Hagel did not look at this text in isolation; rather, he
explored the text within its statutory context, including award limits.78 After
doing so, Judge Hagel concluded that "the applicable statutes, and
amendments thereto" were clear. 79 Despite finding the text of the statute
clear in context, Judge Hagel talked about the purpose of the statute,
finding that the purpose further supported the court's interpretation of the
text: "We believe that our interpretation of the applicable statutory
language is most consistent with the intent of Congress in enacting it."80
Finally,Judge Hagel suggested that even if the question were "a close one,"
the court would apply a policy-based canon to resolve the conflict; namely
that any interpretational tie would be resolved in the veteran's favor.8'
Hence, Judge Hagel did focus on text, as any textualist would do; however,
he did not focus exclusively on text. Had Judge Hagel used a more
traditional textualist approach, he would have completed his analysis after
finding the text clear; instead, he considered other intrinsic and policy-based
sources.8 2 Hence, because Judge Hagel was willing to consider a variety of

73

Id at 255 (quoting 38 U.S.C. §3500 (2006)).
SSee id at 255.
75S* eg., PRB Enters., Inc. v. S. Bnmswick Planning Bd., 518 A.2d 1099, 1101 (NJ. 1987) (stating that a
purpose clause that followed an enacting clause was substantive because of its location).
7
6Omwm, 22 Vet. App. at 255 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 3510 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
" Id (quoting 38 U.S.C. §350 1(aX1XAi)-(ii) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
' & id at 255-56.
9S id at 258.
onId at 259.
1Id at 259 (refening to the presumption that interpretive doubt should be resolved in favor of the veteran
pursuant to Brm v. Gmbu, 513 U.S. 115 (1994)).
SS mpam Part II.C.
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sources other than the text despite the relative clarity of the statute, he
applied soft plain meaning to resolve this case.83
Similarly, in Sursely v. Peake the Veterans Court affirmed the Board's
decision that refused a veteran's request for two separate clothing
allowances.84 The relevant statute authorized clothing allowances for
disabled veterans who use a prosthetic or orthopedic appliance that tends to
wear out or tear clothing.85 The veteran had an artificial arm and was in a
wheelchair because he had lost both of his legs and his arm while serving in
the military.86 Because he had two separate disabilities, he requested two
separate clothing allowances.8 7 The Board had affirmed the regional
office's denial of the second claim based on the fact that the relevant statute
used the singular: "shall pay a clothing allowance of $662 per year."88 The
Veterans Court affirmed the denial.89 Judge Schoelen, writing for the court,
used soft plain-meaning theory. She first found the language clear: "The
statutory language ... dearly provides only one clothing allowance per
eligible veteran."90
Notably, Judge Schoelen rejected the veteran's
argument that "a" could mean "each." 9 ' In doing so, she said, "It is notable
that the appellant argues that the statute unambiguously provides for his
interpretation, but in order to reach that result the word 'a' must be
replaced with 'each."' 92 Judge Schoelen refused to reject the clear meaning
of the word "a" so readily. "The 'strong presumption' that the plain
language of the statute expresses congressional intent is rebutted only in
'rare and exceptional circumstances,' when a contrary legislative intent is
clearly expressed."93 ThusJudge Schoelen focused heavily on the text.
Yet, despite finding the text clear, Judge Schoelen turned to the
legislative history of the Act to confirm that "the [legislative] history ...
further support[ed] the conclusion that Congress intended each eligible

83 In general, Judge Hagel is a moderate textualist, rather than a soft plain-meaning theorist.
S* eg.,
Jackson v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 207, 211 (2005) ("[Bjecause we hold that the language of the regulation is
dear and not ambiguous, that is 'the end of the matter."' (quoting Broun, 513 U.S. at 120)). Like most judges,
Judge Hagel is not dogmatic about a chosen theory.
8
Sussely v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 21 (2007), rm'd, 551 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding the statute to be
ambiguous and resolving "interpretive doubt in the veteran's favor' (citing Brwn, 513 U.S. at 118)).
5Id at 22.
as1d

- Sm id (quoting 38 U.S.C.
Id at 28.

8

§ 1162 (2000))(emphasis added).

0Id at 22.
91Id at 25.

9 Id
9
Id (quoting Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135-36 (1991).
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veteran to receive only one clothing allowance."94 In looking at this history,
Judge Schoelen made it clear that she expected the litigants to address
legislative history; indeed, she chastised both parties for failing to do so.95
Simply put, these litigants did not "talk Judge Schoelen's talk," so to speak:
"The appellant did not address the legislative history of [the statute], but the
Secretary has done so[, a]lthough it is unclear why the Secretary did not
address legislative history in his brief."9 6 Hence, in approaching the
interpretive process, Judge Schoelen focused on the plain meaning of the
text, found it clear, and then looked to legislative history to confirm her
interpretation. She thus applied a softer version of textualism.
In this case, legislative history later proved to be critical. The Federal
Circuit reversed the Veterans Court's decision.97 After finding the language
clear, the Federal Circuit reviewed the enactment history.98 Originally, the
statute had permitted clothing allowances for individuals using "a prosthetic
or orthopedic appliance or appliances."99 In 1989, Congress amended the
statute to delete the word "appliances" and to insert the singular
"appliance." 0 0 According to the court, this extrinsic evidence, the
amendment, showed that Congress intended "to provide additional benefits
for those veterans ... who use multiple orthopedic appliances."'(' Thus,
the attorney missed a powerful argument, which could have cost his client
the case.
2. Modern, Moderate Textualists
A second form of textualism is modern, or moderate, textualism.
Moderate textualists believe that when the meaning of the text is clear
(based on the plain meaning of the words within their statutory context)
interpretation is complete and no other sources should be consulted. 0 2 Like
soft plain-meaning textualists, moderates rely heavily on the plain-meaning
canon; however, for moderates, this canon plays a more central role in
interpretation than it does for the soft plain-meaning textualists. 0 3 A

9 Id at
95 Sid

26.

9Id
7

Surselyv. Peake, 551 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1356-57.
9 Id (quoting Veterans' Compensation and Relief Act of 1972, Pub. L No. 92-328, § 103, 86 Stat. 393,
9

98 Id at

394).

'.Id at 1357.
101lId
F. Manning, Tfttalwn ad dieEquiy ofde&MD, 101 COLUM. L REv. 1, 108-09 (2001).
eS eg, Wilt v. Brnswick Plaza LLC., 703 N.Y.S.2d 700, 702 (Sup. CL 2000) ("If the wols . .. have a

10S2rJohn
103
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moderate textualist will look beyond text to nontextual sources only when
the text is ambiguous, absurd, or contains a scrivener's error.l" Indeed,
some moderates even refuse to consider other intrinsic sources, such as
codified purpose, findings, and title, when the text is clear. 05
Today, many judges use moderate textualism; the Veterans Court
judges are no different. 06 For example, Judge Hagel used moderate
textualism in Jackson v. JVicholson when he looked at the text of the relevant
statute and the statutory context.107 After finding the text clear, he stopped
the interpretive process. 08
At issue in Jackson was whether the term "appellate decision" in a U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) regulation referred to a Board
decision or referred to a Federal Circuit decision. 09 Certainly, "appellate
decision" in the abstract could mean decisions of the Federal Circuit
because the Federal Circuit is a federal appeals court. But Judge Hagel
noted that language is not looked at in a vacuum." 0 Rather, statutory and
definite meaning, which involves no absurdity or contradiction, then there is no mom for construction and courts
have no right to add to or take away from that meaning.").
0 Se Manning, spra note 102, at 108-09 ("Modem textualists ... are not literalists. In contrast to their
early twentieth-century predecessors in the 'plain meaning' school, they do not claim that interpretation can
occur 'within the four comers' of a statute, or that 'the duty ofinterpretation does not arise' when a text is 'plain.'
Rather, modem textualists acknowledge that language has meaning only in context. ... [hey believe that
statutory language, like all language, conveys meaning only because a linguistic community attaches common
understandings to words and phrases, and relies on shared conventions for deciphering those words and phrases
in particular contexts. Hence, textualists ask how 'a skilled, objectively reasonable user of words' would have
understood the statutory text, as applied to the problem before the court. The 'reasonable user' approach gives
textualists significant room to account for the nuances of language, a factor that is especially significant in a
mature legal system with a rich set of background legal understandings and conventions.... Like any reasonable
language user, textualists pay attention to the glosses often put on language (even in ordinary usage), the
specialized connotations of established terms of art, and the background conventions that sometimes tell readers
how to fill in the gaps inevitably left in statutory directions." (footnotes ornitted)).
1o Se eg., Caminetti v. Unites States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917) ("[T]he [tide] given to an act ... cannot
change the plain import of its words."); Jurgensen v. Fairfax County, 745 F.2d 868, 885 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating
that when "'the operative sections [of a statute] are dear and unambiguous,' the preamble of the statute is
'neither essential nor controlling in the construction ofthe Act" (alteration in original)).
106S eg., Ramsey v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 16 (2006), in which Judge Mooran identified what
he believed to be the appropriate approach to statutory interpretation:
The plain meaning [of a statute] must be given effect unless a literal application of [the] statute will
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention ofits drafters. Only where a statute's plain
meaning leads to an absurd result that Congress dearly never could have intended is this plain
meaning rule abandoned for a review of the applicable legislative history and statutory construction.
If it is cear that . . . the literal import of the text ... is inconsistent with the legislative meaning or
intent, or such interpretation leads to absurd results, the Court will not reach that result.
Id at 30 (alteration in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Io0SeJackson v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 207, 210-11 (2005).
1" Id at 211.
10 Id at 208. Note that interpreting regulations does not materially differ from interpreting statutes. S id
at 210 ("The basic principles that apply to construing statutes apply equally to construing regulations." (quoting
Oter-Castro v. Principi, 16 Vet App. 375, 380 (2002))).
11oSa id at 210.
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regulatory context affect meaning.'I As for the regulatory context, Judge
Hagel noted that at the time the regulation was promulgated, the term
"appellate decision" could have referred only to Board decisions because
there was, at that time, no appeal process beyond the Board." 2
Additionally, because the Secretary used the phrase consistently in its
regulations to refer to Board decisions and not Federal Circuit decisions,
"the Secretary's interpretation would be harmonious with the rest of title 38
while [the veteran's] interpretation would result in an anomaly."" 3
Examining the statutory context,Judge Hagel noted that "[t]he Secretary's
interpretation of [the regulation] comports with the statute, but [the
veteran's] interpretation does not."114 After examining the regulatory and
statutory contexts," 5 Judge Hagel concluded that because "the language of
the regulation [was] clear and not ambiguous, that [was] 'the end of the
matter."'" 6 Judge Hagel looked at no other sources." 7
Similarly, in Barela v. Peake, ChiefJudge Greene of the Veterans Court
used moderate textualism." 8 The issue in that case was whether 38 U.S.C.
§ 1310 provided an independent basis for a veteran's surviving spouse to
seek benefits or whether the spouse had to qualify first for benefits under a
separate statute." 9 The Board had held that the statute at issue did not
provide an independent basis for seeking benefits.120 In affirming, Chief
Judge Greene first examined the text and structure of the statute and found
the language clear.' 2 '
Despite finding the text clear, he next examined the legislative history,
which, he concluded, further supported the Board's interpretation.122 As
noted, moderate textualists generally do not look beyond clear text; so you

"IId
2Id

113Id
4
1 Id at211.
" Seeid at 210.
"6M at 211 (quotingBrown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994)).
"7 Interestingly, nowhere in the opinion did judge Hagel mention the applicable standard of review of
agency interpretations of regulations. That standard, known as Auer deference, directs courts to aflirm agency
interpretations of their own regulations unless that interpretation is "plainly ermneous." Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452,461(1997). For the reasonsJudge Hagel cited, the Department's interpretation was not plainly wrung.
" Sw Barela v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 155 (2008) (affinning Board's detentination that a statute allowing for
increased benefits did not serve as a basis for an initial grant of benefits), af'd 584 F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (using moderate textualism to resolve the issue and stating that "[a]lthough the plain language of [the
section], in a vacuum, can be interpreted [as the surviving spouse suggested],... [t]he context of [the section] and
the placement of [the section] reveal [the section's meaning]").
"9Id at 156. The spouse was seeking dependency and indemnity compensation benefits. Id

"' Seid at 157-58.
122S id at 158-59.
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might wonder why I have characterized this opinion as one evincing
moderate textualism. I do so because when Judge Greene turned to the
legislative history, he specifically noted, "[E]ven if there were any ambiguity in
the plain language of the statement, and we hold that there is not, the
legislative history accompanying the statute[, specifically a committee
report,] clarified the intent of Congress not to create a new avenue for
obtaining ... benefits." 23 This "even if there were any ambiguity"
language, which I call "the ambiguity caveat," allows moderate textualists to
examine nontextual sources despite clear statutory language.124 In this case,
ChiefJudge Greene referred to the ambiguity caveat before he turned to the
legislative history.125 Soft plain-meaning textualists do not need the
ambiguity caveat to examine other sources of meaning.
Note that even though Chief Judge Greene used moderate textualism,
he did not ignore legislative history.' 26 Indeed, understanding how to find
and to use legislative history is essential to good advocacy. In this case, the
attorney representing the spouse failed at this simple legal task by neglecting
to bring the relevant legislative history to the Veterans Court's attention.127
Further, he stated repeatedly and mistakenly during oral argument that
"there was nothing in the legislative history . . . that pertained to the
question before the Court and [he] specifically responded that there were
no Committee reports of note."' 2 8 Chief Judge Greene vigorously
disagreed, finding that "a review of the legislative history of the [Act]
expressly contradict[ed the attorney's] assertion."129 Moreover, ChiefJudge
Greene was so irritated by the attorney's behavior that he cited the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct regarding competence and diligence,
reminding the attorney "not to depart from these obligations." 3 0
The Federal Circuit affirmed, also using moderate textualism.' 3
According to Judge Prost, the language, in its textual context, was clear that
the statute did not provide an independent basis for an award: "Although

' Id at 159 (emphasis added).
124Se- eg., Kilpatrick v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 1, 6 (2002) ("[E]ven if the Court were to find [the statute]

ambiguous, which it does not, . . . interpretive doubt in statutory interpretation is to be 'resolved in the veteran's
favor."' (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994))); Davenport v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 476, 484
(1995) ("[E]ven were we to find any ambiguity, which we do not, ... 'interpretative doubt is to be resolved in the
veteran's favor."' (quotingBroun, 513 U.S. at 118)).
15 SBarel 22 Vet. App. at 159.
6Sm id at 158-59.
17Sw id at 159.
128Id

19Id at 158.
3 Id at 159.
1'3Se Bae1a v. Shinseki, 584 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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the plain language of [the section], in a vacuum, [could] be interpreted [as
the surviving spouse suggested,] ... [t]he context of [the section] and the
placement of [the section] reveal [the section's meaning]."132 Note that
moderate textualists do not suggest "that interpretation can occur [only]
'within the four corners' of [the] statute" being interpreted.' 3 3 "Rather,
[moderate] textualists acknowledge that language has meaning only in
context." 134 That context includes the language of the entire act and even
the entire code. In this case, Judge Prost found the placement of the statute
within the statutory scheme to be conclusive of meaning and looked no
further. 3 5
Other judges on the Federal Circuit also use moderate textualism. As
noted above, in Sursely v. Peake the Veterans Court had affirmed the Board's
decision that refused a veteran's request for two separate clothing
allowances pursuant to a statute that required the VA to pay "a clothing
allowance of $662 per year." 3 6 Using moderate textualism, the Federal
Circuit reversed.' 37 Judge Garjarsa, writing for the court, first found the
language clear and then concluded that "a clothing allowance" could refer
to multiple awards despite Congressional use of the singular article "a." 38
To reach this conclusion, Judge Gajarsa quoted a codified canon of
interpretation that "words importing the singular include and apply to
several . . . things." 39 Thus, even though the statute used the singular "a,"

Congress did not necessarily intend the singular. So, Judge Gajarsa focused
on different language within the statute:
The key to clearly understanding the statute is the connection between the
phrases "a clothing allowance" (setting out the benefit) and "a prosthetic
or orthopedic appliance" (setting out the qualification for the benefit).
This language is not a limitation, and does not expressly limit the veteran
to a single clothing allowance. Instead, by linking receipt of the benefit to
a single qualifying appliance, Congress recognized that multiple appliances
might allow the award of multiple benefits. 1-

3

Id at 1384.

13

See
Manning, supra note 102, at 108.

134

Id

5
Barela, 584 F.3d at 1384. The court did aeject the veteran's absurdity argument. See id (statingthat "[i]t is
not the prerogative of this court to second-guess the policy deteminations ofCongress").
6
Sursely v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 21, 22 (2007) (emphasis added) (stating that "[t]he statutory language ...
dearly provides only one clothing allowance per eligible veteran"), raid,551 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
' See Sursely v. Peake, 551 F.3d 1351, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir.2009).
'3 98 S id at 1356.
1 Sid

40

1

1Id
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Like ChiefJudge Greene of the Veterans Court, Judge Gajarsa did not
stop with this clear text. 1 While this failure to stop might suggest he used
soft plain-meaning textualism, he qualified the remainder of his search.
Specifically, he indicated that even if there were ambiguity, any ambiguity
could be resolved by reference to two other sources: one extrinsic and one
policy based.142 The extrinsic source was the enactment history identified
above; notably, that the statute was amended to omit the plural word
"appliances," retaining the singular word "appliance." 43 This amendment
showed that Congress intended to allow multiple benefits.144 The policybased source was the veteran's-benefit presumption, articulated in Brown v.
Gardner "interpretive doubt is to be resolved in favor of the veteran." 45
This presumption exists in the veterans' area because courts presume that
Congress drafts with this presumption in mind. 4 6 Thus, even though Judge
Gajarsa examined sources after finding the text clear, he did so only after
invoking the ambiguity caveat.
Lastly, Judge Gajarsa turned to the Secretary's remaining argument
that this interpretation was absurd. Absurdity, like ambiguity, is another
method, or caveat, by which moderate textualists avoid the plain meaning
of text in a statute.147 The Secretary had argued that the veteran's
interpretation would allow a veteran with multiple prosthetic appliances to
recover multiple clothing allowances for a single item of clothing.148 Judge
Gajarsa disagreed that this result was absurd,149 suggesting that the agency
could take this factor into account when issuing an award.5 0 Judge Gajarsa
found the language of the statute clear and looked to nontextual sources
only in the event that ambiguity or absurdity remained; thus, Judge Gajarsa
used moderate textualism in this case. Interestingly, Judge Gajarsa
interpreted the statute differently than Judge Schoelen of the Veterans
Court had, even though both took text-focused approaches.
Similarly, Judge Michel of the Federal Circuit used moderate textualism
in Sears v. Pincipi.'1' In that case, the court addressed the issue of whether a

141
Sm Barela v. Peake,

22 Vet. App. 155, 158-59 (2008).
142 SM &rsly, 551 F.3d at 1356-57.
1'3 Id at 1356-57 (quoting Veterans' Compensation and Relief Act of 1972, Pub. L No. 92-328, § 103, 86
Stat. 393, 394 (amended 1989)).
'"4Se id at 1357.
'45 See id (quoting Bmwn v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"6 See King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220 n.9 (1991).
'1 Se Sursly, 551 F.3d at 1357-58.
148Seeid

" 9 Sw id at 135 8 &n.6.
15oSa id at 1358.
'Se Sears v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1326, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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VA regulation that set an effective date for reopened claims was a
reasonable interpretation of the controlling statute. 152 Finding the text of
the statute ambiguous, Judge Michel, writing for the court, looked next to
the legislative history of the Act to resolve the ambiguity.' 53 Finding the
legislative history ambiguous as well, he turned to an extrinsic source to
resolve the issue, and specifically the Chevron Doctrine-deference to
administrative interpretations.' 5 4 Pursuant to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,' 55 Judge Michel concluded that the VA
regulation was a "reasonable gap-filling or ambiguity-resolving
regulation."' 56
All of these cases show that moderate textualism is alive and well in
both the Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit.
3. New Textualists
Finally, finishing the textualist continuum are the strict, or new,
textualists.
These theorists, like moderate textualists, also require
ambiguity, absurdity, or scrivener's error to look beyond the text. However,
unlike moderates, new texualists refuse to ever look at some types of nontextual sources, such as legislative history, legislative acquiescence, and
unexpressed purpose. New textualists are unique in their refusal to allow
consideration of these sources at all. These theorists believe that it is simply
unconstitutional to consider anything that was not actually subject to the
constitutional enactment process-bicameralism and presentment.
Inexplicably, new textualists do not explain why they will look to
dictionaries, which, of course, do not go through this process. Indeed,
judges sometimes debate which dictionary is more appropriate to use. 57
The Veterans Court is not immune from this dictionary debate. For
example, in McDowell v. Shinseki, the majority and dissent disagreed about
both the relevant statutory language and the appropriate dictionary to use
to interpret their identified language.' 58 In that case, the issue for the
Veterans Court was whether DNA test results were more relevant to
determining paternity than lay testimony that the veteran considered the

152 Se

id at 1327.
Se id at 1329.
4
' Se id at 1330.

5

'55Chevmn U.SA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-14 (1984).
156
&Sh, 349 F.3d at 1332.
157
&T eg., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 225-28 (1994) (identifying some dictionaries
as legitimate and others as not).
Ism
Sm McDowell v. Shinsek, 23 Vet. App. 207, 212 n.1, 213 (2009).
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child his own.15 9 The Board had denied a woman's claim that her minor
daughter was the child of a veteran when DNA test results showed that
there was only a .208% chance that the veteran was the father. 160
In affirming the Board's decision, Judge Schoelen identified
"illegitimate child" as the relevant language to be interpreted.161 She then
used Webster's New World Dictionag and Random House Webster's Unabridged
62
DictionaU to interpret that term as requiring a biological relationship.'
Hence, she concluded that the VA's reliance on DNA was entirely
appropriate.s6 3 In direct contrast, Judge Hagel dissented and identified the
word "father" in addition to "illegitimate child" as relevant.'64 As for
"father," he concluded that there was no biological requirement for a
person to be a father. 165 He then turned to the term "illegitimate child."' 66
Rejecting the majority's decision to use an ordinary dictionary, Judge Hagel
argued that the term "illegitimate child" had a unique, legal definition;
hence, he believed that a legal dictionary was more appropriate. 67 Because
"[n]one of the law dictionaries contain the phrase 'born of parents' or any
other phrase implying a biological connection," Judge Hagel rejected the
majority's interpretation.168 To be fair, neither of these judges appear to be
new textualists. Yet the court's disagreement illustrates the problem that
arises when judges make a fortress of the dictionary.
New textualists are rare. The most famous new textualist is Justice
Antonin Scalia, who was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1986. He first
articulated his new-textualist theory between 1985 and 1986 during a series
of speeches in which he urged courts to ignore legislative history, especially
committee reports.169 At that time, many members of the Supreme Court

'59 Se id at 210.
1 Seeid at 209-10.
161 Se id at 212.
62
1 SM id at 211-12.
63
5w id at 216.
6 Se id at 217 (Hagel,J., concurring in the result and dissenting in part).
65 S, id
66 S
167 S

id
id

68Sw id at 218. In this case, the Veterans Court owed the Secretary's interpretation of its own regulation a
high level of deference. Indeed, the interpretation should have been controlling unless the appellant was able to
show that the interpretation was plainly wrong. Sa Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1997) (stating that
agency interpretations of regulations are controlling unless plainly erroneous). Given this standard, the majority
was conect to affinn the Secretary's interpretation and the dissent was incorrect to ignore it. S&Mdhall, 23 Vet.
App. at 220 (Hagel, J., concuning in the result and dissenting in part) (incorrectly explaining and applying the
Auer standard).
169Sw Chares Tiefer, The Rafonc
aas ofl4ilatwe Ifstoy in the Supxrne Cour, 2000 WIS. L REV. 205,
215 & n.38 (2000) (citing William N. Eskridge,Jr., TheNw Textuaism, 37 UCLAL REV. 621,651 i.l 15 (1990)).
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used intentionalism and regularly reviewed legislative history to glean
evidence of meaning.17 0 Indeed, courts routinely cited legislative history,
going so far as to find "that a crucial committee or a powerful sponsor had
authoritatively revealed the specific intent behind general statutory
language."' 7 i Justice Scalia argued that legislators do not read the
committee or other reports, and, thus, these reports cannot be relied upon
as articulating the intent of a body that did not even read them:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on
the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a
larger handful of the Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of
which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and
thus most likely to have been understood by the whole Congress which
voted on the words of the statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it),
and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the
provision must be integrated-a compatibility which, by a benign fiction,
we assume Congress always has in mind. I would not permit any of the
historical and legislative material discussed by the Court, or all of it
combined, to lead me to a result different from the one that these factors
suggest.

... [I]t is natural for the bar to believe that the juridical importance of
[legislative history] matches its prominence in our opinions-thus
producing a legal culture in which, when counsel arguing before us assert
that "Congress has said" something, they now frequently mean, by
"Congress," a committee report; and in which it was not beyond the pale
for a recent brief to say the following: "Unfortunately, the legislative
debates are not helpful. Thus, we turn to the other guidepost in this
72
difficult area, statutory language."

Justice Scalia's interpretive process was coined "new textualism" in that
it brought life back to textualism, which had largely disappeared, while
simultaneously narrowing the sources that could be considered. 73 Justice

7oSe id at 214.
17tManning, supra note 25, at 287-88.

72 Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citation omitted). Sometimes judges also turn to legislative history only after lamenting about the lack of
legislative history. Ses eg., Patrie v. Area Coop. Educ. Serv., No. CV000440418S, 2004 WL 1489555, at
*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 16, 2004) ("There is no appellate case law that interprets the word and both
sides agree that the legislative history is of no direct help so this court must try to interpret the meaning
of the 17word 'assault' .... .").
s S Eskridge, sora note 169, at 623-24.
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Scalia initially gained a following for his theory. For example, Judge
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit promoted a similar theory. 74 But with
time, Justice Scalia's theory has garnered less appeal.
New textualism is akin to moderate textualism in its razor-like focus on
the text and its need for ambiguity or absurdity caveats. New textualism
adds only a slight wrinkle in that this theory limits some sources altogether.
This wrinkle has not proved popular. Indeed, in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v.
Mortier, the other Justices joined a footnote explicitly rejecting Justice
Scalia's suggestion that legislative history should never be relevant to
statutory interpretation. 75
Whether popular or not, new textualism has been praised for limiting
judicial discretion, increasing predictability and efficiency, encouraging
careful drafting, and limiting inappropriate uses of legislative history. 7 6
When judges and litigants are constrained by the text of the statute,
statutory meaning becomes more certain and litigation decreases. When
legislative history cannot be considered as relevant to meaning, the cost of
discerning meaning lessens and certainty increases because legislative
searches are neither cheap nor easy. Finally, when legislatures are held to
the words they use, they are more likely to choose those words with care.
But the most important contribution of textualism, particularly new
textualism, is that it returned the focus of judicial interpretation to the text
of the statute.
However, new textualism can also be faulted. First, it can be faulted for
its adherents' unwillingness to consider some sources of meaning, namely
legislative history and unexpressed purpose.'7 7 It makes little sense to

See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 533, 544-51 (1983).
Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991) ("As for the propriety of using
legislative history at all, common sense suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing additional
information rather than ignoring it. As Chief Justice Marshall put it, 'where the mind labours to
discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived.' Legislative
history materials are not generally so misleading that jurists should never employ them in a good-faith
effort to discern legislative intent. Our precedents demonstrate that the Court's practice of utilizing
legislative history reaches well into its past. We suspect that the practice will likewise reach well into the
future." (internal citations omitted)).
176S* ag., Easterbmook, supra note 174, at 544-51.
77Interestingly, legislators seem less convinced that textualism is the pmper theory. SeeJoan Biskupic, Seaa
Takes a Nnow View in Swng Cngres' Wat, 48 CONG. Q WKLY. REP. 913, 918 (1990); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The
PResumption of Rieubili: A Shu4 in Canmical Consbuctim and Its Onsequmca, 45 VAND. L REV. 743, 750 (1992)
(citingJoan Biskupic, Congress Keps Eye on Justiceras Cour Wadhes Ifdl's Woris, 48 CoNG. Q WKLY. REP. 2863
(1991)); see also Bemard W. Bell, MetadnoaticIntaprdtli andSeparation oflhaers,2 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y
1, 35-36 (1998) ("Even though Congress has never formally voted to require that legislative history, or particular
aspects of legislative history, be considered in interpreting statutes, it seems reasonably clear that, over a long
period of time, a large majority of Congress has rjected the absolutist position that legislative history should never
1"

175 Wis.
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prohibit all evidence generated during the legislative process simply because
that evidence was not enacted. Nontextualists do not claim that legislative
history is "a statute, or even that, in any strong sense, it is 'law.' Rather,
legislative history is helpful in trying to understand the meaning of the
words that do make up the statute or the 'law."'" 78 While the text is
authoritative and has the force of law, legislative history provides evidence
of what that law means. In other words, legislative history can help
illuminate the meaning of the words that make up the law. In short, new
textualists' refusal to consider legislative history is simplistic and
misguided.179
Support for new textualism itself has waned in recent years. "Though
often applied, [new textualism] is often condemned as simplistic because the
meaning of words varies with the verbal context and the surrounding
circumstances, not to mention the linguistic ability of the users and readers
It is "a blunt, frequently crude, and certainly
(including judges)." 8
narrowing device, cutting off access to many features of some particular
conversational or communicative or interpretive context that would
otherwise be available to the interpreter or conversational participant."' 8 '
[T]he "minimalist" judge "who holds that the purpose of the statute may
be learned only from its language" has more discretion than the judge
"who will seek guidance from every reliable source."
statutory

interpretation

A method of

that is deliberately uninformed, and hence

unconstrained, may produce a result that is consistent with a court's own
view of how things should be, but it may also defeat the very purpose for
which a provision was enacted.182
Finally, some suggest that there is no "ordinary" or "plain" meaning;
indeed, the act of ascribing plain meaning is itself a subjective act that masks
judicial reasoning from public scrutiny.' 83
Regardless of the popularity of his theory, Justice Scalia properly
returned judicial focus to the text of the statute as the starting point for
interpretation. As a result of his and others' influence, the text of the statute

be used to interpret an ambiguous statute.").
178
Stephen Breyer, On dzeUses ofigilazieflitory inIntopretng Stades, 65 S. CALL REV. 845, 863 (1992).
11See eg., Frederick Schauer, &ah"oy Costructnand the CoordiingFodanofPlain Mea=ng, 1990 SUP. Cr.
REV. 231, 252.
80BIACK'S lAW DICiONARY 1188 (8th ed. 2004).
181Schauer,sora note 179, at 252.
182Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adans 532 U.S. 105, 133 (2001) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (quoting AHARON
BARAKJUDICIALDISCRETION62 (Y. Kaufinann tamns. 1989)).
183
Se Paul E. McGreal, 9Sightg CAnt On the Illgic ofOrnary Srkeh in Staday Inatpretation, 52 U. KAN. L
REV. 325, 328 (2004).
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has gained importance in recent years and likely will retain this importance
in the years to come.
Today, new textualists are relatively rare; however, the case of Lippman
v. Shinseki illustrates new textualism.'84 In that case, the court rejected the
VA's regulation interpreting a provision in the Veterans Judicial Review
Act, which allowed for attorney fees.185 In doing so, the court looked solely
to the text of both the statute and the regulation. 86 Even though the court
87
found the text ambiguous and the regulation absurd,' it looked at no other
sources to reject the VA's regulation as "unduly restrictive[,]...
unreasonable[,]

. . . [and] invalid."1 88

Instead, the court suggested a

hypothetical scenario to show how unreasonable, or absurd, the regulation
was.' 8 9 Neither party discussed the legislative history of this statute. Yet the
legislative history was informative and should have played a role in
90 an opinion that the Lippman
interpretation, as it had in Scates v. Principi,o
court quoted.191 In ScatesJudge Friedman had noted specifically that:
The history of the statutory provisions governing the payment of
attorney fees in veterans benefits cases supports our conclusion that an
attorney discharged during the case is entitled only to a fee reflecting his
contribution to the litigation. Prior to 1988, the applicable statute was
Civil War era legislation that limited attorney fees in veterans benefit
claims cases to $10.00. Congress then recognized that the $10.00 fee limit
was so small as to effectively preclude veterans from employing lawyers to
handle their benefits claims. The Veterans Judicial Review Act reflects
Congress' conclusion that claimants should be able to have legal
representation in pursuing benefits claims. The Act permits lawyers to
receive contingent fees of up to twenty percent of benefits recovered.
Because that percentage was less than contingent fees typically found in
other areas of practice, Congress gave lawyers the offsetting benefit of

18 Lippman v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 243 (2009).
185S id at 253. Judge Hagel authored the opinion. Yet, I am certain that Judge Hagel is not a new
textualist. How am I so sure? In March of 2010, 1 had the opportunity to speak at the Veteran Court's Eleventh
Judicial Conference. Judge Hagel had invited me to speak. The moming before the presentation, we met for
breafaist along with some other people. During that breakfast, he said that he wanted to challenge another ofthe
presenters about that presenter's interpretation of a statute. Judge Hagel then looked at me and said, "I want to
talk about the legislative history. You don't mind if I do that, do you?" And I responded, "No; I'm just surprised
that you want to."

1S w id at 251-52.
181 Se id at 251, 252-53 ("Because the Secretary's [interpretation] does not guard against improper

deprivation of payment to attomeys for work actually perfomed, the regulation is unduly restrictive[,]...
unreasonable] and .. . invalid.").
88

Id

189See
id at 252.

Iso Scates v. Principi, 282 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

191
SeeLipnm, 23 Vet. App. at 247-48.
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certainty of collection; it provided for the Department to withhold that
percentage from the benefits awarded and itself pay the fee directly to the
lawyer.' 92
Because neither party argued the relevance of this legislative history,
and because the Lippman court did not consider this source independently,
the legislative history played no role in the court's final decision. In the end,
despite acknowledging that the court should not impose its own
construction of the statute in light of the statutory gap, the court did so
anyway; it created a rule for attorney-fee awards.193 Thus, the opinion is
redolent of new textualism.
To summarize textualism, textualists, especially those who subscribe to
the moderate and strict forms of textualism, examine the fewest sources.
Textualists will look at the text of the statute (including grammar and
punctuation), the textual context, the statutory context, and the linguistic
canons to determine meaning. The more strictly a judge adheres to the
plain-meaning canon, the less frequently that judge will look beyond text
itself, the fewer non-text sources that judge will consider, and the less weight
that judge will give to these other sources.' 94
B. Intentionalist-BasedTheories
Intentionalist-based theorists reject text-only theories for a variety of
reasons. Like textualism, there is more than one intentionalist-based theory.
Before discussing these different intentionalist-based theories, let us first
discuss the underlying basis for these theories. Intentionalist-based theories
are rooted in the belief that policies chosen by an elected, representative
body should govern society.s95 Intentionalist-based adherents believe that it

c&ates,
282 F.3d at 1366 (citations omitted).
193See Lippman, 23 Vet. App. at 253-54.
19Textualism in the states: Although the Justices of the Supreme Court have wrestled throughout
history with the appropriate theory of statutory interpretation, Congress has not chosen to provide direct
guidance, though some scholars have suggested that it should. In contrast, many state legislatures have
adopted statutes telling theirjudges how to interpret statutes. Perhaps, not surprisingly, textualism is the
most common choice. For example, Connecticut has a textualist directive that reads as follows:
The meaning of a statute shall, in the fust instance, be ascertained frm the text of the statute itself
and its relationship to other statutes. If after examining such text and considering such relationship,
the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,
extratextual evidence of the meaning ofthe statute shall not be considered.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-2z (2010). Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, North Dakota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania also
have textualist directives. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 2-4-203 (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 1-15 (2005);
IOWA CODE § 4.6 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-39 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.49 (West
2010); 1PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(b) (2008).
15 SeeJEuM & HRICKoupra note 54, at 47.

2010]

THE ART OF STATUTORrLNTERPRETA TION

87

is the duty of the court to discern the intent of that representative body. 9 6
Thus, intentionalist-based theorists attempt to understand the meaning of
statutes by looking broadly for legislative intent.
There are two kinds of intent: specific intent and general intent.
Specific intent can be defined as the intent of the enacting legislature on the
specific issue presented. For example, assume that a white litigant sues an
employer, claiming that the employer's affirmative action program violates
the law. 9 7 Assume further that the statute at issue, Title VII, says that no
person shall be discriminated against on the basis of race. A judge looking
for specific intent would search the text of the statute, related statutes, and
legislative history to determine whether the enacting legislature intended the
word "discriminate" to apply to affirmative action programs that promote
the hiring of minority races. In other words, if the issue before the court
had been presented to the enacting legislature, how would it have decided
the issue? For a judge seeking specific intent, it matters whether the
enacting legislature had a specific intent as to the language in dispute, in this
example the word "discriminate."
In contrast, general intent refers to the overall goal, or purpose, of the
legislature. Assume the same example: a white litigant sues his employer,
claiming that the employer's affirmative action program violates Title VII.
A judge looking for general intent would search the text, related statutes,
social context, and legislative history to determine whether the enacting
legislature's goal was to make society color-blind or whether it was to
improve the plight of minorities (or whether it was for some other purpose).
If the legislature's goal was to improve the plight of minorities, then
affirmative action programs further this goal. Hence, the employer's
program would not violate the law as interpreted to further this purpose. If,
instead, the legislature's goal was to make society color-blind, then
affirmative action programs would violate the law because they would not
further this goal. For a judge seeking general intent, it does not matter
whether the enacting legislature had a specific intent as to the language in
dispute-in this example the word "discriminate." What matters instead is
the goal, or purpose, of the legislation.
As you might expect, there are two prominent intentionalist-based
theories. They are (1) intentionalism, which focuses on specific intent, and

'96
S id
197This

hyothecal isbased on Uniftdeektwk= v. Webff, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).

88

UNIVERSITY OFLOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:59

(2) purposivism, which focuses on general intent. We will explore each of
these two theories in detail next.
1. Intentionalism: The Theory
As noted, intentionalists, sometimes referred to as originalists, seek out
the specific intent of the legislature that enacted the statute. They ask, "What
did the enacting legislature have in mind in regard to the specific issue
before the court when the legislature enacted the statute?"' 98 To answer the
question, intentionalists start with the statutory language-the text. But
intentionalists do not stop with the clear text, as a textualist would; rather,
intentionalists move on and peruse other sources of meaning. Unlike a
textualist, an intentionalist does not need a reason, such as ambiguity or
absurdity, to consider sources beyond the text.
Because intentionalists are looking for help in discerning the specific
intent of the enacting legislature, they often find statements made during the
legislative process and early draft versions of the bill enlightening. If these
extrinsic sources demonstrate that the ordinary meaning was not what was
intended, intentionalists may reject the ordinary meaning for a meaning
that furthers the intent, as shown in these other sources.
Remember that adherents of the competing theories differ regarding
their view of the appropriate role for the judiciary when interpreting
statutes.199 Intentionalists believe that their role is to be faithful agents of
the enacting legislature, working to ensure that the legislature's choices are

1 As noted above, discerning the specific intent of the enacting legislature is often a difficult, if not
impossible, task. Moreover, limiting interpretation to a static point in time creates its own issues. For
these reasons, in 1907, Dean Roscoe Pound urged courts to adopt "imaginative reconstructionism" for
discerning the intent of the enacting legislature. Using Dean Pound's theory, a judge would try to
imagine what the enacting legislature would have intended had the precise factual problem before the
court been raised during the enactment process. To do so, Dean Pound proposed that judges recreate
intent by examining the available historical evidence, including the statute, with a sense of morality and
justice to determine what the enacting legislature likely intended given the realities of today. See Roscoe
Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L REV. 379, 381 (1907). This theory borrows from commonlaw analysis and civil-law practice in that the statute guides, but often does not answer, the question;
rather, by using reason and analogy, a judge can apply the statute to situations not explicitly covered by
the language to arrive at a just result. Imaginative reconstructionism is a normative theory in that it
allows the judiciary to consider public policy when making interpretation choices. Using "practical
reasoning," judges can adopt flexible interpretations based on current public norms. Judge Learned
Hand was a proponent of this theory.
Not surprisingly, imaginative reconstructionism suffers from some of the same criticisms as
intentionalism: Whose intent is reconstructed? Should unenacted information play any role in
interpretation? While Dean Pound's theory has had some followers in academic circles, it garners little
support in practice. Hence, it warrants no more than a footnote.
19 S supra Part IEI.
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Intentionalists wish to avoid imposing
implemented. 200
preferences. As stated by Alexander Hamilton:

89

their own

It can be of no weight to say, that the courts on the pretense of
repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional
intentions of the legislature.... The courts must declare the sense of the
law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of
JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their
pleasure to that of the legislative body. The observation, if it proved any
thing, would prove that there ought to be no judges distinct from that
body. 201
Intentionalists believe that examining sources other than the text helps
constrain the judiciary and helps maintain its separate function-that of
interpreting statutes-by providing more information for a fully informed
decision. Further, intentionalists believe that intentionalism furthers the
doctrine of separation of powers by protecting the legislature's power to
legislate free from judicial interference. Judges must implement the enacting
legislature's intent, not impose their own policy preferences.
Like textualism, intentionalism has appeal; but it too is imperfect. For
example, consider whether Congress, a group of more than five hundred
individuals, all with different constituencies, can have one unified intent.
"The chances that ... several hundred [individuals] each will have exactly
the same determinate situations in mind as possible reductions of a given
[statutory issue], are infinitesimally small." 202 More likely, each legislator
will have a unique reason for voting for a bill. For example, Title VII,
which prohibits discrimination in the workplace, was a compromise of
various constituencies: the liberal Northern and Eastern legislators (who
sponsored the bill) wanted to help black workers; the conservative Southern
legislators wanted to ensure that black workers were not helped at the
expense of white workers; and finally, the conservative Midwestern
legislators, the pivotal voters, wanted to limit government interference in
business altogether. 203 With so many different goals, it is unlikely that each
of these legislators would share a specific intent as to whether affirmative
action programs were allowed. Additionally, one might ask whose intent
matters more, "the 51st senator, needed to pass the bill, or the 67th, needed

2m SejELuM & HRcI,
morm note 54, at 47-48; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynwic Stattoy Inerprea,
135 U.PA. L REv. 1479,1498,1554 (1987).
201 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 380-81 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
202 Radin, .npranote 7, at 870.
203 Se WIliAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL, LEGISIATION AND STATUrORY INTERPRETATION 219
(2000).
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to break the southern filibuster?"204 In United Steelworkers v. Weber,205 the case
in which this issue was addressed, the majority and dissent disagreed on
whose intent was central. The majority focused on the liberal, Northern
and Eastern legislators, 206 while the dissent focused on the conservative,
Southern legislators. 20 7
Of course, intentionalists respond to that criticism by arguing that a
group can have intent, although you should consider whether their
definition of intent sounds more like a definition of purpose:
Conceptually, . . . one can ascribe an "intent" to Congress in enacting
the words of a statute if one means "intent" in its ... sense of "purpose,"
rather than its sense of "motive." One often ascribes "group" purposes to
group actions. A law school raises tuition to obtain money for a new
library. A basketball team stalls to run out the clock.... Obviously, one of
the best ways to find out the purpose of an action taken by a group is to
ask some of the group's members about it. But, this does not necessarily
mean that the group's purposes and the members' motives or purposes
must be identical. The members ... may have different, private motives for
their own actions; but that fact does not necessarily change the proper
characterization of the group's purpose.....

... In practice, we ascribe purposes to group activities all the time
208
without many practical difficulties.
While the individual members may have different, private motives for
their own actions, the existence of private motives does not necessarily
eliminate the possibility that the group has a common goal or agenda. For
example, consider a sports team as it takes the field or a political party as it
enters an election. The group's agenda and the members' motives might
not be identical, but each group has one, overarching intent: to win.
Intentionalism is thus less about the reality of always finding a unified intent
and more about the possibility of finding one.
To find specific intent, intentionalists commonly rely on legislative
history. Intentionalists' use of legislative history is often criticized. Some
argue that legislative history can be manipulated to support any result a

Id
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
w Se id at 202-04.
2 Sw id at 235, 246-47 (RehnquistJ., dissenting).
M Breyer, supra note 178, at 864-65.
20

2
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judge or a legislator wants. 209 Judges may choose which legislative history
to use, while rejecting contradictory history. Justice Scalia wrote that in
"any major piece of legislation, the legislative history is extensive, and there
is something for everybody. As Judge Harold Leventhal used to say, the
trick is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out your friends." 210
As anyone familiar with modem-day drafting of congressional committee
reports is well aware, the [language was] . . . inserted, at best by a
committee staff member on his or her own initiative, and at worst by a
committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the
purpose of [that language] was not primarily to inform Members of
Congress about what the bill meant . . . , but rather to influence judicial
construction. What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know
that his or her [language became] . . . the law of the land . . .211
Additionally, some argue that legislators can manipulate legislative
history; for example, a legislator may decide to add information to the
legislative record to influence future litigation.212 Finally, some point out
that legislative history is not subject to bicameral passage and presentment,
the constitutionally prescribed process for enactment. Thus, critics suggest
that even if one unified intent exists, that intent should not be ascertained
from anything other than the language of the statute for it is only the text
itself that goes through the enactment process.
Intentionalists do not ignore these criticisms. Rather, they accept the
criticisms as valid but suggest caution, not whole-scale rejection of the use of
legislative history. 213 True, legislative history is not enacted law, but
intentionalists do not claim that it is. Rather, they claim that legislative
history can offer insight into what some or all of the legislators may have
been thinking when the law, which did go through the constitutionally
prescribed process, was enacted.
Moreover, the legislature acts by
delegation: by "pre-agreement, whether tacit or explicit, . . . a subgroup of
the legislature [acts] on behalf of the whole body in working out the details
of laws that the entire body could not possibly take the time and effort to

9

20 See
ScAUIA, Japranote 21, at 36.
21

0od

211Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (ScaliaJ., concuning).
2

12Cf Amalgamated Transit Union Incal 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th
Cir. 2006) (Bybee,J., dissenting) (chastising the mjority for relying on a Senate committee report that "was not
submitted until eighteen days after the Senate had passed the bill, eleven days after the House had passed the bill,
and ten days after the President signed the bill into law').
213Se Breyer, supra note 178, at 863; McGreal, supra note 183, at 373 ("Ifthe legislative process has its own
assumptions and word usages, the process itself should be the context within which we seek a statute's meaning.").
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understand in full detail." 214 Committees regularly draft reports to educate
the remaining legislators. Because intentionalists wish to know what
legislators were thinking, legislative history, especially the committee
reports, can be useful. In short, legislative history simply offers a fuller
picture of the legislative process for a particular bill. It is not, in and of
itself, law.
Hence, intentionalism is a theory that is focused on finding the specific
intent of the enacting legislature in regard to the language at issue in the
statute and in the context of the specific issue before the court. Today, the
theory focuses first on text, but also relies on all relevant sources, including
the legislative history and unenacted versions of the bill.
Today, intentionalism is less commonly used than textualism; however,
in Wanless v. Shinseki,215 Judge Davis of the Veterans

Court used

intentionalism. In that case, the issue was whether a privately owned prison
qualified as a "Federal, State, or local penal institution." 216 Judge Davis
initially spoke in textualist terms, suggesting that if the language of the
statute was clear, then judicial inquiry would be complete. 217 He then
found the language ambiguous, suggesting that the language "[did] not
explicitly include or exclude private prisons under State contract." 218 He
next reviewed the statute's tide and structure, both intrinsic sources.2 19 He
found that these latter sources "support[ed] the conclusion that Congress
intended the compensation reduction provision to apply to all
veterans [,] ... regardless of whether the facility in which they were
incarcerated was publicly or privately operated." 220
ThusJudge Davis began his analysis with the text and intrinsic sources,
reminiscent of textualism. But he did not stop his analysis with these
conclusive, intrinsic sources. Rather, he turned to an extrinsic source:
legislative history. "The legislative history of section 5313 provides
significant insight into the congressional intent underlying the section 5313
provision regarding benefits reduction for veterans incarcerated for a
felony." 221 He found this history compelling. Moreover, he noted that the

21LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: IAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 6-16
(2010).

215
Wanless v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 143 (2009).
216Se id at 144-45 (citing 38 U.S.C. §5313(aXI) (1993)).
2"See id at 147 (citing Smith v. Derwinski, 2 Vet App. 429, 431 (1992)).
219Sm id at

147-48.

22o Id at 148.
221I
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veteran's interpretation was "unpersuasive" because the veteran had
"provide [d] no support in the legislative history" for his argument that
Congress intended to exclude State-contracted private prisons from the
statute's coverage. 222
Further, Judge Davis rejected the veteran's second argument regarding
a recent amendment to the statute. In the amendment, Congress had
specifically added "other penal institution or correctional facility" to the list
of relevant prisons. 223 The veteran had argued that this subsequent
amendment to the statute showed that Congress believed that the statute as
originally drafted did not apply to privately run prisons. 224 Judge Davis
rejected the veteran's argument because it was contrary to the legislative
history: "[T]he legislative history of the [amendment] states that it was
promulgated as part of 'technical and clarifying amendments to title 38."'225
For Judge
Davis,
the
legislative-amendment
history
"further
demonstrate[d] .. . that

the

prior

version

of the

statute

adequately

expressed the congressional intent to provide for a reduction of benefits to
veterans incarcerated for commission of a felony, regardless of whether the
institution in which a veteran is confined is a State institution or a Statecontracted institution." 226 Hence, Judge Davis used intentionalism in this
case, finding legislative history to be dispositive evidence of Congress's
specific intent on the issue.
Similarly, Judge Davis used intentionalism in Robinson v. Shinseki.227 The
issue in that case was whether a woman who pled nolo contendere to killing her
veteran husband could nevertheless recover benefits from the VA.228 The
statute at issue used mandatory language"shall"-requiring the payment
of the benefits, and it contained no common-law slayer exception. 229
Despite the clear language of the statute, the Board denied her claim based
on a regulation interpreting the statute that specifically prohibited a
surviving beneficiary from recovering benefits when that beneficiary
intentionally and wrongfully killed the veteran. 230

222

Id at 149.
146 n.3, 149.
2 S id at 149.
5Id (quoting 152 CONG. REC. H9015 (daily ed. Dec. 8,2006) (statement ofRep. Buyer)).
22s Id at
2 4

26 Id (emphasis added).

227Robinson v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 440 (2009).
22

Se id at 441-42.
- Sw38 U.S.C.§ 1318 (2006).
2"SeeRobison 22 Vet. App. at 444.
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The widow appealed, arguing that the Secretary did not have authority
to issue the regulation under the relevant statute. 23' In response, the
Secretary said that it had never claimed that the statute at issue provided
such authority. 232 Rather, the Secretary argued that authority came from
another statute, which allowed the VA "to prescribe all rules and regulations
which are necessay and appropriate to carry out the laws administered by the
Department." 233 This latter statute offered a sufficient grant of authority
from Congress to issue the regulation interpreting the benefits statute.234 To
this argument, the widow responded that because the general language in
the second statute was followed by four specific examples, each of which
was procedural, the Secretary did not have authority to issue a substantive
regulation.235 The Veterans Court rejected the widow's arguments.236 In
rejecting her expressio unius argument (that the expression of the procedural
examples excluded the ability to issue substantive regulations), Judge Davis
noted that a single sentence in a statute did not limit the court; rather, the
court must "look to the provisions of the whole law and to its object and
policy."237
Looking at the law as a whole, Judge Davis reasoned that the statutory
scheme showed that "Congress most certainly did contemplate that the
Secretary would institute substantive rules under the authority of [the
enabling statute]."238 As for the benefits statute specifically at issue in the
case, Judge Davis was not troubled by the mandatory "shall" language, nor
by the statute's silence on this topic.239 Rather, he found it "highly unlikely
that Congress would have intended to confer DIC benefits of persons whose
claims to those benefits result from their own acts of intentional and
wrongful homicide." 240 Instead, "Congress legislates against a common law
background. .. [which includes] a long-standing common law principle
known as the 'slayer's rule."' 24 1 Thus, Judge Davis concluded that
Congress's likely awareness of this common-law background should defeat
clear text.242

1
3 See id
232 Se id

3
Se
34

at 443-44.
at 444.

id at 443 (quoting 38 U.S.C. §50 1(a) (2006)).

Se id at 444.
S id at 443.
23Sm id at 445.
237Sa id (quoting Meeks v. West, 216 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cr. 2000)).
3

2

2s8

Id

239S id at 445-6.
0
Id at 444.
2

Id

242Sm id

at 445--46.
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2. Purposivism: The Theory
Purposivists focus on the general intent, or purpose, for the statute,
rather than the specific intent of the enacting legislature. The difference is
subtle. As we just saw, intentionalists look for the enacting legislature's
specific intent and search broadly to find it. Likewise, purposivists look
broadly. 24 3 Then, you might ask, how do these theorists differ? These two
theorists differ in their reason for examining these extratextual sources of
meaning. When examining extratextual sources, intentionalists seek specific
intent: What did the enacting legislature intend regarding the precise
problem presented to the court? For example, did the legislature intend to
allow a wife to receive benefits when that wife intentionally killed her
veteran husband? 2" In contrast, when examining extratextual sources,
purposivists seek general intent: What problem was the legislature trying to
redress, and how did it redress that problem? Purposivists do not focus on
whether the enacting legislature thought about and had an answer to the
precise issue presented in the case. Rather, purposivists focus on what
problem the legislature was trying to address and how the court's decision
would best further that purpose.2 45 "If a statute is to make sense, it must be
read in the light of some assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a
rule, with no purpose or objective, is nonsense." 246
You will remember that intentionalists are willing to look at all sources
of evidence to determine statutory meaning, but focus particularly on the
text, legislative amendments, and legislative history. Similarly, because
purposivism "focuses on the broad goals of a statute, on the problem the
legislatures meant to address by passing the statute [, b]oth the text and the
legislative history help a court determine those goals." 247
Thus,
purposivism, like intentionalism, begins with the text and, similarly, does not
stop there:

243 S &g., Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Gmup, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976) ("When aid to
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law'
which forbids its use, however dear the words may appear on 'superficial examination."' (quoting United States
v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534,543-44 (1940) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
4
24 See Robiun, 22 Vet. App. at 444.
245 Once the purpose and remedy have been identified, then purposivists interpret the statute to
further that purpose subject to two caveats: judges should not give words (1) "a meaning [those words
cannot] bear" nor (2) "a meaning [that] would violate ... established polic[ies]." HENRY M. HARTJR.
& ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF
LAw 1374 (William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
246Kad N. Uewellyn, Renarks on he Theny ofAppelae Dision and die Ruler or CannsAbout Hmo StauerAre To
Be Consuted,3 VAND. L REV. 395,400 (1949)
247Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, "Is There a Ted in This Class?' The Conict Beuan Tehtualism and

Antibust, 14J. CONTEMP. LEGALIssUES 619,666(2005).
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There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a
statute than the words by which the legislature under took to give
expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of
themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In such cases we
have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has led to absurd
or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the
purpose of the Act. Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning
did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one "plainly at
variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole" this Court has
followed that purpose, rather than the literal words. When aid to
construction of the meaning of words as used in the statute is available,
there certainly can be no "rule of law" which forbids its use, however clear
the words may appear on "superficial examination." 248
Purposivism, also known as legal-process theory, is perhaps the oldest
form of interpretation. 249 In the Middle Ages, detailed statutes were difficult
to produce, and it was hard to develop and circulate multiple drafts. 250

Photocopiers did not exist. Thus, early English lawmakers voted based on
the general goal, or purpose, of the statute, not on the precise statutory
language. 25 1 To interpret statutes enacted in this way, judges focused on
"the spirit" of the legislation rather than on the exact wording. Purposivism
permitted this focus. 252
Like early English statutes, early American statutes were also very
general. For example, the Sherman (Antitrust) Act, which was enacted in
1890, fits nicely on one page, while the Patriot Act, which was enacted in
2001, takes up 132 pages.253 The legislature drafted such broad statutes
early on to allow reasoned judicial development of an area of law. With so
little textual guidance, judges needed something other than the text to guide
and unify interpretation. Purpose provided that unifying something. Judges
could easily choose interpretations by discerning which interpretation best

TrtckingAss'ns, 310 U.S. at 543-44 (footnotes omitted).
S JELLUM & HRIcIK, stpa note 54, at 51 ("Purposivism . . . may be a relic of early common law
reasoning impropedy brought fmm that realm into the modem realm.").
250JELLUM, Aupra note 3, at 27.
28Am.
49

2

252

Id

253
JELLUM & HiucIK, supra note 54, at xxvi.

Compare the versions of the House and Senate healthcare
reform bills. The Senate version, the "Patient Pmtection and Affordable Healthcare Act' is 2409 pages long. Se
S. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://fiwebgate.access.gpo.gDv/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= Il
congblls&docid=f:h3590as.txLpdf The House version, "Affoidable Healthcare for America Act" is 2016 pages
long. Se H.R. 3962, 11 Ith Cong. (2009), available at http://energyommerre.house.gov/Press_ I/healthcare/
hr3962_bill_textpdf
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furthered the statutory purpose. Purpose helped judges fit the statute into
the legal system as a whole and make coherent public policy. 254
In the United States, purposivism made an early appearance in the
1892 case Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States.255 In that case, a statute
made it unlawful for anyone to import any alien into the United States to
"perform labor or service of any kind."256 Holy Trinity Church had hired a
rector from England-rectoring, according to the Court, qualified as both
labor and service.257 Despite the clarity of the text, the Court held that the
statute did not apply because the purpose of the Act was to "stay the influx
of. . . cheap unskilled labor." 258 Rectoring, the Court concluded, was
neither cheap nor unskilled labor.259 Famously stating that "[i] t is a familiar
rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within
the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its
makers," 260 the Court resolved the case using purposivism.
Purposivism came more fully into vogue shortly after World War II,
during a time of "relative consensus[,] ... sustained economic growth, and
burgeoning optimism about government's ability to foster economic growth
by solving market failures and creating opportunities." 26 1 The Supreme
Court followed this theory, for the most part, throughout the 1950s and
1960s. 262 By the 1970s, however, America was changing. Economic
growth had faltered, and issues relating to war, family, and government
were much more controversial. Government became the enemy rather
Additionally, statutes became more complex and
than the savior.
comprehensive. With those changes came a change in the judicial theory of
statutory interpretation. Intentionalism garnered favor with such justices as
ChiefJustices Burger and Rehnquist. 263 Today, Justice Breyer remains one
of the few remaining Supreme Court proponents of purposivism, although

2 Se United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424,431-32 (1943) (Frankfurer,J., dissenting) (cautioning, "[t]he
notion that because the words of a statute are plain, its meaning is also plain, is merely pernicious
oversimplification. . . . A statute, like other living organisms, derives significance and sustenance from its
environment, fiom which it cannot be severed without being mutilated. Especially is this true where the statute,
like the one before us, ispart ofa legislative process having a history and a purpose.").
255Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
256 Id at 458.
257

S,

id

Id at 465.
259Se id at 472.
258

26oId at 459.
26,

WIulAM N. EsKUDmGE, JR. & PHIUP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGIStATION:

STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PuBuc PoucY 562 (2d. ed. 1995). See garralg Tiefer, .xupra note 169, at
213-15.
262SwJELLUM.sura note 3, at 28; Tiefer, .spra note 169, at 213-15.
6
2 SeeJELLUM, .spranote 3, at 28; Tefer, supra note 169, at 213-15.
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To most judges, purposivism

appears to be a relic from early statutory development that has little

application in a world in which complex statutes are the norm. Today,
there is a renewed emphasis on the importance and primacy of the text.
Remember that adherents of the competing theories differ regarding
their view of the appropriate role for the judiciary.265 While intentionalists
view themselves as faithful agents of the legislature, purposivists view
themselves as 'faithful agent[s] of a well-functioning regulatory regirne."266 For this
reason, purposivists attempt to discern the evil, or mischief, that the
legislature wanted to address when enacting the statute.267 Next, they
identify the remedy the legislature selected to address that mischief.268
Finally, they interpret the language of the statute to "supress the
mischief... and advance the remedy."269 To find the mischief and remedy,
purposivists examine text and legislative history, as well as other relevant
sources, such as social and legal context. 270 "Legislation has an aim; it seeks
to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy ....

That aim . . . is not

drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evinced in the language of the
statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose."27 '
Purposivists, like intentionalists but unlike textualists, do not need a
reason to look beyond the text. To a purposivist, a statute makes sense only
when understood in light of its purpose. 272 Understanding a statute without
understanding its purpose is nonsensical. 273 For example, consider a
hypothetical city ordinance prohibiting "vehicles" in the park.2 74 Is a
scooter a vehicle? To decide this issue, a purposivist judge might ask why
the city council enacted the ordinance in the first place. If the council's

2

4

&JELLUM,.wpra note 3, at 28.

m Smpra Part

Ell.

266
ESKRIDGE ET AL, wpra note 203, at 7.
261See Heydon's Case, (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (K.B.), 639; 3 Coke 7a, 7b.
268 S
269

id

Id

270For an example of social context, consider the New Deal and the statutes enacted during that time. For
an example of legal context, consider statutes enacted in response to the Tellico Dam situation. See gmeal TVA
v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
271Felix Frankfurter, &e Rjiadaus ote Radng ofStatder, 47 COLUM. L REv. 527, 538-39 (1947).
27 Sm William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Word Fary Undastandings of the 'Judicial Por"in Statutmy
Interpreaoa;1776-1806, 101 CoLUM. L REV. 990, 1000 (2001) ("Mhe letter of the law is the body of the law,
and the sense and reason of the law is the soul of the law." (quoting Eyston v. Studd, (1573) 75 Eng. Rep. 688
(K.B.) 696; 2 Plowden 459, 465) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
273Se Frankfirter, spra note 271, at 539.
274See Bernard W. Bell, 5VoMore Vdader in the Park" Raiving ie Hat-Fulbr
dlbate To Inroduce S&toada
Coatrucon,48J. LEGAL EDuc. 88, 88 (1998) (citing In L Fuller, Ibidvim andfuldefi to Law-A Rep# to Ifkyisor
Han, 71 HARV. L REv. 630,663 (1958); H.LA Hart, Asitin andthe Separaton ofLaw adMorals, 71 HARV. L
REv. 593,607 (1958)).
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purpose was to limit air and noise pollution, then "vehicle" should not be
interpreted so broadly as to include scooters. If, instead, the city's purpose
was to increase pedestrian safety, then, perhaps, "vehicle" should be so
interpreted. This example shows how purpose can aid interpretation.
While purposivism and intentionalism are similar, purposivism has one
Purposivists can interpret statutes in
advantage over intentionalism:
situations never contemplated by the enacting legislature. "Purposivism . . .
renders statutory interpretation adaptable to new circumstances." 275 For
example, return to the hypothetical city ordinance prohibiting vehicles in
the park. 276 A purposivist judge could determine whether the ordinance
applied to skateboards and Segways even if these "vehicles" did not exist
when the ordinance was adopted. In contrast, intentionalists might
conclude that the ordinance does not apply because the city council could
not have intended to regulate something not in existence when the law was
enacted.277 Thus, purposivism offers flexibility that intentionalism does not
and allows for laws to change with the times, something true intentionalism
is incapable of.278
Another advantage of purposivism is that, like intentionalism,
purposivism allows its adherents of determine meaning from a wide variety
of sources.279 Arguably, purposivists seek meaning from the broadest
number of sources and thus make the most informed decision of all the
theorists. Purposivists will consider all of the relevant evidence bearing on
the meaning of the language at issue because the more evidence the court
considers, the more likely the court will arrive at a proper conclusion
regarding that meaning.
But there are criticisms of purposivism as well. The most troublesome
aspect for purposivists, of course, is that it is difficult to discern a statute's
purpose. Ideally, legislatures would include a findings or purpose provision
in the enacted text of every statute; 280 a codified purpose clause would make
text-focused judges more comfortable. 28 1 Unfortunately, legislatures do not

215ESKRIDGE ET AL, supra note 203, at 221.
276See Bell, supra note 274, at 88.
277
SeeJELLUM, supranote 3, at 29.
278

S,

d

279S

id

280Under early English law, judges relied heavily on such clauses, viewing these clauses as the best evidence
ofstatutory purpose. Se id at 124.
28'Surprisingly, textualists will not review such components, even those clauses that have been codified,
absent ambiguity, absurdity, or scrivener's error. S*; eg.,Jurgensen v. Fairfax County, 745 F.2d 868, 885 (4th
Cir. 1984) ("If the operative sections [of a statute] are dear and unambiguous, the preamble of the statute is
neither essential nor controlling in the constnction of the Act.") (internal quotation marks omitted); set also Price
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regularly do so. Thus, judges often look for unexpressed purpose. To find
such unexpressed purpose, purposivists consider legislative history, legal
history, social context, and other sources. But these sources may not be
conclusive.282 What then? Some legal theorists have suggested that to figure
out a statute's primary purpose, a judge should posit various situations. In
other words, a judge should start with the situations clearly covered and
radiate outward. 283 Yet, even if purpose is discernible in this or some other
way, there may be competing ideas of how to further the identified purpose.
For example, is affirmative action the best way to achieve racial parity?
A related criticism of purposivism is that statutes often have more than
one purpose and these purposes can conflict. For example, one purpose of
Title VII, which prohibits discrimination in the workplace, was to increase
the number of African-Americans in the workforce. 284 Another purpose
was to make hiring and other work-related decisions color-blind. 285
Voluntary affirmative action programs further the first purpose, but not the
second. 286 Is the fact that one purpose is furthered enough to sustain an
interpretation, or must all purposes be furthered? Purposivism does not
answer this question.
Similarly, a statute may have one purpose, while an exception to that
statute may have a conflicting purpose. For example, one purpose of the
Freedom of Information Act 287 (FOIA) is to encourage open government.288
But some of the exceptions within the Act, such as prohibiting the disclosure
of personnel files, exist to protect individual privacy.289 When a judge
interprets an exception, which purpose should control: the purpose of the
Act or the purpose of the exception? 29 0 In other words, should the judge
Dev. Co. v. Orem City, 995 P.2d 1237, 1246 (Utah 2000) ("[Preambles] may be used to clarify ambiguities, but
they do not create rights that are not found within the statute, nor do they limit those actually given by the
legislation.").
282 SmJELLUM, sWpra note 3, at 28.
28 Se HART & SACKS, .ra note 245, at 1377-0.
4
2' Se United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203, 208 (1979).
285See id at 203-04.
28 Se id at 204.
2875 U.S.C. §552 (2006).
28
SegraMy Church ofScientology v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 612 F.2d 417, 431 (9th Cir. 1979) (Wallace,J.,
dissenting) (arguing that an exception to FOIA should be narrowly interpreted because the Act "is in favor of
disclosure" (quoting NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 220 (1979)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
2 Set §552(bX6).
2N In Church of Scientolegv, 612 F.2d 417, the majority and dissent split regarding which purpose
mattered. The Church of Scientology had requested certain documents from the Department of Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) under FOA. Id at 419. FOIA generally requires disclosure of all
government records subject to limited exceptions. See § 552(a). The exception at issue in the case
exempted from disclosure "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes ... [if] the
production of such law enforcement records or information could ... disclose the identity of a confidential
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interpret the exception in FOIA narrowly to better further the purpose of
the Act as a whole or broadly to better further the purpose of the exception?
Again, purposivism does not answer this question.
Another criticism of purposivism is that judges are constitutionally
required to interpret statutory language. 291 They are not appropriate
policymakers because they are not elected and they are not expected
constitutionally to perform this function.292 "[C]onsultation of extrinsic,
non-textual sources of interpretation in every case, regardless of whether the
language of the statute is clear ... subordinates the statutory text and
renders the analysis more vulnerable to subjectivity." 293 When judges make
decisions based on their own policy choices, disguised as purpose, at the
expense of the legislature's choices, judges aggrandize their constitutional
role and intrude into the legislative arena. 294
In addition, some suggest that purposivism encourages "activist" or
"unintended" interpretation. "[P]urpose . . . is normally of such generality
as to be useless as an interpretative tool, unless ... it is being used as a cover
for the judge to 'do justice' as he sees fit."29 5 Finally, purposivism may have
been more appropriate when statutes were broader and more general and
source ... [or if the records or information were] furnished only by the confidential source." § 552(b)(7)(D)
(emphasis added); see Church ofScientoloV, 612 F.2d at 419. The issue for the court was whether the term
"confidential source" included non-human sources, such as law enforcement offices. See Church of
Scientologv, 612 F.2d at 420.
Starting with the text, the majority found it clear: "'[C]onfidential source' includes foreign state
and local law enforcement agencies . . . ." Id Despite the clarity of the text, the majority turned to the
legislative history of the exception for confirming evidence of specific intent and purpose. Id at 422.
Finding no evidence of specific intent, the majority searched for purpose. See id at 423. Reviewing the
conference committee report, the President's veto statement, and floor debates surrounding the override,
the majority concluded that the legislature did not use the term "confidential source" to mean only
human sources. See id at 424-26. Rather, this history showed that the purpose of the exception was to
ensure that law enforcement would be able to gather information. See id at 425. Hence, a broad
interpretation was appropriate in the case based on both the purpose and the text. See id at 427.
The dissent disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the legislative history. Agreeing that the
text was clear, the dissent nonetheless perused the legislative history for evidence of specific intent. See id
at 428 (WallaceJ., dissenting). Unlike the majority, the dissent found specific intent: Congress intended
to cover only human "confidential sources." Id. Further, the dissent disagreed with the majority that the
purpose of the exception was the appropriate purpose to consider. See id at 431. Rather, the purpose of
FOIA, not FOIA's exception, was relevant. See id Because the basic policy of FOIA "is in favor of
disclosure," the dissent argued that the act should be narrowly interpreted. Id Thus, unlike the majority,
but like the Court in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), the dissent would have
allowed the legislative history and general purpose to trump plain meaning. See Church ofScientologv, 612
F.2d at 431 (WallaceJ., dissenting).
29 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §2.
2' See Walker, spm note 65, at 206.
293State er reL Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty, 681 N.W.2d 110, 125 n.8 (Wis. 2004).
24 See linda D.Jellum, "Which Is To Be Marter," theJudiciay or the Igisbhode? Whmn Stmtoy Diratim Violate
Separahon qflhars, 56 UCIA L REV. 837, 840 (2009).
25 State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 609 (Conn. 2003) (Zarella,J., dissenting) (quoting Walker, supra note
65, at 236) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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thus were more in need of, and more amenable to, such interpretations.29 6
Purposivism, critics say, may be a relic of early common-law reasoning
improperly brought into the modern realm.297
Not surprisingly, opinions from the Veterans Court and Federal Circuit
evince purposivism. For example, Judge Davis used purposivism in Sharp v.
Shinseki.298 The facts of the case are complicated: In 1995, a VA regional
office had granted a veteran's service-connection claim.29 9 In the letter
granting the claim, the VA told the veteran that he had one year to file
additional information if he wanted additional compensation benefits for his
dependents and if he wanted those benefits to be retroactive to the date of
the award; he failed to forward the information timely.soo When he did
send in the additional information, the VA awarded the benefits, but,
because he forwarded the information after the one-year deadline, the
award was effective only back to the date of the late filing (January 1997),
not to the date of the original award (August 1995).301 The veteran did not
appeal the additional compensation award,30 2 which for our purposes will
be called the first award (theJanuary 1997 award).
In 1998, the VA regional office determined that the veteran was
unemployable due to service-related injuries and awarded him benefits
effective from the date of his injury, December 1, 1988.303 The veteran
challenged this award because it did not include additional compensation
for his dependents retroactive to 1988.304 This award will be called the
second award (the 1998 award). When the regional office denied the

29

&e Walker, supm note 65, at 237.

2m7
Judge Learned Hand was a noted purposivist; he acknowledged that searching for purpose was "a

hazardous process," but believed that judges could not "escape it, once [they] abandon[ed] literal interpretation,"
which he described as "a method far more unreliable." Borella v. Borden Co., 145 F.2d 63,64-65 (2d Cir. 1944),
affd, 325 U.S. 679 (1945). Judge Hand recognized one risk ofpurposivism:
On the one hand [a judge] must not enforce whatever he thinks is best, he must leave that to the
common will expressed by the government. On the other, he must try as best he can to put into
concrete form what that will is, not by slavishly following the words, but by trying honestly to say
what was the underlying purpose expressed.
Walker, srpm note 65, at 215 (quoting Learned Hand, Natl Advisory Council on Radio in Educ. Law Series I
Lecture No. 14, Hos FarIs ajWFrw in Radainga lkiin? (CBS radio broadcast May 14, 1933)).
" Se Sharp v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 267, 272 (2009).
2 Id at 269.
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challenge, the veteran sought Board review; however, he died while the
appeal was pending.3 05
After the veteran died, the veteran's wife filed for the additional
compensation based on the second award.306 The regional office denied the
request, reasoning that the first award was final and that the law did not
allow for an earlier effective date once entitlement to additional
compensation had been established.30 7 The Board affirmed; the wife
appealed to the Veterans Court.308 The issue before the court was whether
the statute required that additional compensation benefits be awarded to
dependents based on the first qualifying rating (in this case the first award)
or whether it could be based on any qualifying rating (in this case the
second award).309 To resolve this issue, the court had to reconcile two
related statutes: 38 U.S.C. § 1115, which awarded additional compensation
for dependents, and 38 U.S.C. § 5110(f), which established the effective date
for any such awards.310
To reconcile the statutes, the court first examined § 1115 and found
that the language of that statute "clearly and succinctly address[ed] when a
veteran [was] entitled to additional compensation for dependents." 31 1
Additionally, Judge Davis turned to the legislative history and noted that
"[t]he purpose of the statute [was] also clear." 3 12 The purpose of the statute
was to "'defray the costs of supporting the veteran's . . . dependents' when a
service-connected disability is of a certain level hindering the veteran's
Thus, the purpose would favor a broad
employment abilities."313
interpretation of § 1115.
However, the text of § 1115 was silent regarding how the effective date
for such claims should be determined. In the face of this silence, Judge
Davis did not hesitate, but turned to the legislative history to resolve the
issue of what effective date should apply to § 1115 claims:
The limited legislative history enlightens the Court as to the purpose of
providing additional compensation for dependents, but such history does
not assist the Court in determining whether Congress intended additional

30

5SeId

3

Id at 269-70.

308 Id

30 Set id
310 S, id

at 271.

3"1Id

"'12d at 272.
"'3Id (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-1054, at 19 (1978)).
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compensation for dependents under section 1115 to be on (1) only the first
rating decision meeting statutory criteria of section 1115 or (2) any rating
decision meeting the statutory criteria.3 14
Finding the legislative history unenlightening, Judge Davis returned to the
text and concluded that entitlement to § 1115 benefits should accrue
whenever the statutory factors were met.315 Although the statute did not
explicitly so provide, Judge Davis concluded that whenever a veteran met
§ 1115's criteria, the veteran's dependents were impliedly entitled to
additional compensation.3 1 6
A finding of implicit entitlement was not, however, enough to resolve
the issue before the court. The remaining issue, the effective date of the
award, was still pending. Hence, Judge Davis next turned his focus to the
second statute at issue, § 5110(f), to determine whether that statute
conclusively resolved the question.3 17 Judge Davis turned first to intrinsic
sources, including the text, dictionary definitions, and the statutory
scheme. 318 Next, he reviewed the legislative history and concluded that
"neither statute on its face nor legislative history provides any guidance in
answering the precise question at issue."3 19 Having exhausted intrinsic
sources and finding nothing useful in the legislative history, Judge Davis
next turned to and rejected the relevant regulations because they "merely
parrot[ed]" and "mirror[ed]" the statutory language. 320 Ultimately, to
resolve this issue, Judge Davis turned to a policy-based source: Gardner's
presumption that "interpretative doubt is to be resolved in the veteran's
favor." 32 1
While Judge Davis's opinion in this case has aspects of soft plainmeaning theory, for he started with text and did not end there, I have
classified it as purposivist because Judge Davis stated that he was looking at
the legislative history specifically to find the purpose of the two statutes in
question. But this case shows that the categories of interpretive theory are
imprecise.

318S&

d at 273.
3 I at 274.
2 Id at 274-75.
32Id at 275 (quoting Bmwn v. Ganiner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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As for the Federal Circuit, Reizenstein v. Shinseki provides an example of
purposivism. 322 In that case, the Federal Circuit affirmed the VA's position
that one of its regulations applied only prospectively and not
retrospectively. 323 In doing so, Judge Prost, writing for the majority, focused
on the purpose of the regulation, 324 which was to protect veterans who were
dependent on incoming compensation. 325
Granted, Judge Prost first
suggested that the "text of the regulation [did] not unambiguously answer
the question," 326 but he did not explain why the text or other intrinsic
sources failed to resolve the issue. Moreover, Judge Mayer, who dissented,
used moderate textualism and specifically chastised the majority for
ignoring the clear text:
The text of the regulation is clear ....

...

I cannot agree with the majority's reasoning that a regulation can

be ignored when its application would not further .

.

. policy goals ....

This [theory] makes a mockery of the literal text and invites the judiciary
to cherry-pick among policies purportedly the source of the regulation
even though the text speaks for itself.327
Hence, purposivism is alive and well within the Veterans Court and
Federal Circuit.

C. A Compromise Theory
For this reason, Alaska's
All of the theories have shortcomings.
judiciary specifically rejected all of the above theories and created its own
unique theory. 328 This theory, the "sliding-scale theory," blends elements of
textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism. 329 It allows judges to consider
a statute's meaning without first finding ambiguity, absurdity, or scrivener's
error by applying a sliding scale of clarity. The sliding-scale theory states
simply that all evidence of meaning is relevant; however, "the [clearer] the

322Reizenstein v. Shinseki, 583 F.3d 1331 (2009).
323SM id at 1333.

324Although this case involved the interpretation of a regulation rather than a statute, for our purposes,
there isno difference.
35 Id at 1337.
57 I at 1338-39 (MayerJ., dissenting).
"8 Se IeFever v. State, 877 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
329Seid
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statutory language, the more convincing the evidence of a contrary
legislative purpose or intent must be."330 In other words, Alaska adopted
soft plain-meaning theory with a twist.
The Alaska judiciary considered, but rejected, modem textualism
because that theory overly restricted the inquiry. 33 1In doing so, the Alaska
Supreme Court explained its choice. According to the court, "words are
necessarily inexact and ambiguity is inherent in language," thus, other
sources of meaning often prove helpful in construing a statute.332 For this
reason, even if the statute under consideration is facially clear, the legislative
history can be considered because it might "reveal an ambiguity not
apparent on the face of the statute."333
Alaska's sliding-scale theory has inherent appeal. It rejects textualism's
potential overreliance on text and intentionalism and purposivism's
potential underreliance on text. Under the sliding-scale theory, the plainer
the text, the more convincing the contrary indications of meaning must be
to trump the text. This soft version of textualism turns the plain-meaning
canon into a rebuttable presumption: the ordinary meaning will control
absent convincing evidence that the legislature intended a different
meaning. In many ways, this theory blends the best of the above theories,
while avoiding their weaknesses: Text is the primary, but not exclusive,
evidence of meaning.
In at least one case, the Veterans Court followed this approach. In
Davenport v. Brown,334 the court held that a vocational-rehabilitation statute
did not require a veteran's service-connected disability to "materially
contribute" to the veteran's employment handicap.3 35 In reaching this
holding, Judge Farley first found the text of the statute clear, but then
examined the legislative history.336 In doing so, he specifically stated, "The
Secretary must make an extraordinarily strong showing of clear legislative
intent in order to convince us that Congress means other than what it
ultimately said."337 Ultimately, Judge Farley concluded that the Secretary

3"Id at 1299-1300.
s" Sm Municipality ofAnchorage v. Sistem ofProvidence in Wash., Inc., 628 P.2d 22, 27 n.6 (Alaska 1981).
332Id

333 Id

Davenport v. Bmwn, 7 Vet. App. 476 (1995).
M3kI
at 477.
336 Se id at 481-86.
" Id at 484 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33
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failed to make the extraordinary showing necessary because the legislative
history actually supported the veteran's argument.3 38
IV. WHY THEORY MATTERS
In conclusion, there are a multitude of interpretive theories but no
universal agreement as to which is best. Moreover, none of these theories is
necessarily better than any other. Hence, one might wonder, "Does theory
matter?" For practicing attorneys, the answer to the question, "Does theory
matter?" is absolutely "yes." Academics love to debate the pros and cons of
each of the theories.339 But no one theory best resolves statutory meaning.
There is simply no empirical way to prove that one theory reaches the
"right" interpretation more often than another because there is no way to
discern the true meaning of statutory language. Hence, the right approach
to interpretation will continue to be debated in academic journals and in
courtrooms.3 o
The reality is that, beyond Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook, few
judges are so rigid in their doctrine that they see only the trees and not the
forest.341 Few judges doggedly adhere to just one theory. Our review of the
Veterans Court and Federal Circuit judges proved this point. While Judge
Hagel generally leans toward moderate textualism, he has written opinions
that use soft plain meaning and new textualism, and he has signed onto
opinions that might more correctly be labeled as intentionalist. Similarly,
Judge Davis leans more toward intentionalism, but elements of textualism

338Id

at 486.
3 See, for example, the famous article involving the hypothetical case of the Speluncean explorers.
Lon L. Fuller, Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949). In this article, the late
Professor Fuller explored a hypothetical case involving cannibalism and survival. See id He drafted the
article to resemble a court opinion in which the hypothetical judges used different interpretive theories to
determine whether the relevant statute had been violated. See id The statute provided simply: "Whoever
shall willfully take the life of another shall be punished by death." Id at 619. The article demonstrates
the relevance of interpretive theory on decision-making.
3o Connecticut's and Wisconsin's judiciaries have had some interesting debates about these theories. Se;
eg., State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562 (Conn. 2003); State ex rel Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 68
N.W.2d 110 (Wis. 2004).
341
EvenJustice Scalia may not be as dogmatic as he appears. Se Miranda McGowan, Do as IDo, Not as I
Say. An FnpiaImsgation ofJrustce Salia's OrdiayMain Method ofStahdty Intsprdtaton, 78 MIsS. LJ. 129 (2008)
(concluding that even when Justice Scalia believes the text controls, he regularly decides that the ordinary
meaning of the text has been overcome in the particular case). Justice Scalia has acknowledged as much: "I play
the game like everybody else ... rm in a system which has accepted rules and legislative history is used .... You
read my opinions, I sin with the rest of them." Frank H. Easterbmok, What Does Ieslative Ilstoy Tell Us?, 66
CHI.-KENT L REV. 441, 442 n.4 (1990) (quoting JUDGES AND LEGISIATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTONAL
CoMrIY 174-75 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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find their way into his rhetoric. Indeed, to be effective, judges must eschew
rigidity.
Professors Eskridge and Frickey best summed up the reality of today's
doctrine:
We do not think the Supreme Court has entirely returned to the preScalia days and suggest the following generalities about where it is today.
First, the text is now, more than it was 20 or 30 years ago, the central
inquiry at the Supreme Court level and in other courts that are not
following the Supreme Court's lead. A brief that starts off with, "The
statute means thus-and-so because it says so in the committee report," is
asking for trouble. Both advice and advocacy should start with the
statutory text. Because the Court frequently uses the dictionary to provide
meaning to key statutory terms, the advocate should incorporate this
methodology as well ... . Second, the "contextual" evidence the Court is
interested in is now statutory as much as or more than just historical
context. Arguments that your position is more consistent with other parts
of the same statute are typically winning arguments. Similarly, as [one
case] indicates, the Court today goes beyond the "whole act" rule to
something like a "whole code" rule, searching the United States Code for
guidance on the usage of key statutory terms and phrases.
Third, the Court will still look at contextual evidence and is very
interested in the public law background of the statute. If a statute seems to
require an odd result . . .

,

the Court will interrogate the background

materials to find out why .... It remains important to research and brief
the legislative history thoroughly. The effective advocate will appreciate
that the presence of such materials in the briefs may influence the outcome
342
more than the opinion in the case will indicate.
V. CONCLUSION
In reality, while academics will continue to rigorously argue the
legitimacy of the various theories, judges will remain less wedded to them:
In deciding a question of statutory interpretation in the real, as
opposed to the theoretical, world, few judges approach the interpretive
task armed with a fixed set of rigid rules. In briefs, the parties make all of
the arguments they can think of, whether based on the relevant case law,
the "plain text," the legislative history, or the statute's underlying purpose
or purposes in effectuating a policy or remediating mischief. I have
difficulty imagining that any judge, presented with such arguments, would,

542

EsKRIDGE ET AL, supra note 203, at 770-71 (footnote omitted).
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for example, simply evaluate the so-called plain meaning of the statute and
then stop reading the brief. Even a judge's strongest theoretical
inclinations are tempered by the judge's desire to accord a fair hearing to
the parties' arguments and to be open to all credible materials that might
enhance the judge's understanding of the case.343
Judges regularly mix theories, fail to identify their theory, and even
change theories; ultimately, judges want to further justice, not to be
dogmatically rigid. Perhaps, as legal realists theorize, none of this theory
stuff really matters. The reality is that judges decide cases based on their
own personal notions ofjustice and the underlying equities of the case. For
this reason, you should not expect to win your case simply because you
correctly identify a judge's preferred theory. But, the theories do provide a
language and a roadmap for you to present your case to a particular judge.
If you know your judge's theory, then you can structure your argument to
best influence that judge. For example, if you are arguing before Justice
Scalia, you know by now that you should not start your brief with an
analysis of the legislative history. Ultimately, however, and regardless of a
judge's theory, to win your case you must prove to each judge that ruling for
your client is the just and right thing to do.

343Walker, supra note 65, at 232-33. When he wrote this articleJohn Walker was the ChiefJudge
of the Second Circuit.

